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This project arises out of an interest in the theology of grace and 
the theological question of the relationship between nature and 
grace. It rests on the conviction that a complete theology of grace 
can only be developed if due account is taken of the different 
approaches to the theology of grace adopted by the three main 
Christian traditions , namely Orthodoxy , Catholicism and 
Protestantism • 
It is axiomatic to this project that an adequately complete theology 
of grace which draws on all three traditions has not yet been 
developed • Another central conviction on which this project rests is 
that the position adopted on a fundamental theme like nature and 
grace will determine to a large extent one's position on less 
fundamental themes. 
This is an attempt , then , to show how the ideas of three formative 
theologians on "nature and grace" can benifit the development of a 
comprehensive doctrine of grace today • 
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METHODS AND INTENTIONS. 
The method adopted will be to study the thought on human nature and 
grace of formative theologians from the three major Christian 
traditions • In the light of these three studies an outline of the 
elements of a comprehensive theology of grace will be presented • 
To clarify things at the outset, some tentative explanations of what 
is meant by the terms "nature" and "grace" are necessary. The two 
questions which form the basis for the "nature and grace" theme are 
these : what is a human being , and how can God be said to affect the 
lives of human beings? Now the description of what a human being is 
constitutes an account of human nature , and the description of how 
God affects people constitutes an account of divine grace • A number 
of points should be evident simply from these explanations • Firstly, 
one's assumptions about human nature will to a large extent affect 
one's theology of grace • Secondly , following from this , an 
adequate understanding of the theology of grace is not possible 
without a clear picture of the prevailing theology of human nature • 
Thirdly , the theme "nature and grace" is clearly a fundamental one 
in any theology • Finally , it should also be clear that assumptions 
about the nature of persons and God's effect on them are present, 
implicitly or explicitly, in any theological discussion. 
One of the best ways to gain an overall insight into the position 
adopted by a tradition of Christian thought is to consider the work 
of influential , formative theologians , and to this end I have 
selected three theologians , one from each of the three groups 
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mentioned, and wi 11 show how they hand 1 e the "nature and grace II 
theme, Having done this, in each case I will show how the theologian 
views the significance of Jesus and the importance of the church in 
the light of his view of nature and grace. These last two themes are 
vast enough in themselves, so they will only be considered in summary 
fashion in order to illustrate the implications of the given 
theologian's understanding of nature and grace, 
On the question of whether it would not be better to use statements 
from councils and synods of the three groups instead of the works of 
individual theologians, my reasons for deciding to use theologians 
are as follows, 
Firstly, the theologians considered, Gregory Palamas, Thomas Aquinas 
and Martin Luther, have all had such formative influences on their 
respective groups that councils and synods have been shaped by their 
theology. While it may never have been the case officially, and while 
it may not be the case at all today, it is true that these 
theologians have had a dominant formative influence on their 
respective groups in the past, and that today's theology cannot be 
considered independently of that past. 
Gregory Palamas was an Orthodox monk and archbishop of Thessalonica 
in Byzantium in the fourteenth century, In the defense of monastic 
spirituality he developed a number of dogmatic insights which gave 
expression to the Orthodox tradition in such a profound way that he 
was rapidly accorded a pre-eminent position among the "doctors" of 
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the Orthodox church • In the words of Kallistos Ware 
His teaching was confirmed by two councils 
held at Constantinople in 1341 and 1351, 
which , although local and not Ecumenical, 
yet possess a doctrinal authority in 
Orthodox theology scarcely inferior to the 
Seven General Councils themselves. (1) 
Thomas Aquinas was a member of the Catholic Dominican order, a 
mendicant fraternity dedicated to contemplation and preaching of the 
gospel. He lectured in university cities like Paris and Naples for 
most of his adult life • His synthesis of the recently "discovered" 
Aristotelian philosophy and Catholic theology became so revered in 
subsequent centuries that , like Palamas, he was regarded as one of 
the leading "doctors" of his church. His theology enjoyed official 
sanction , particularly in the counter-reformation period and the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries • Many Catholics have 
regarded his work, written in the thirteenth century as a "classical 
moment in the history of Christian thought." (2) 
Martin Luther's sixteenth century clash with Catholicism made him the 
initiator and exemplar of the Protestant Reformation. Given the less 
"monolithic" nature of Protestantism, one cannot say that Luther 
commands or commanded authority in the same ways as Palamas and 
Aquinas, but one can say that his theology is typical of the 
Protestant ethos. This , and the fact that he stands at the beginning 
of the Protestant tradition , indicate his reliability as a 
representative of that tradition. As Koenigsberger has put it, in any 
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study of the Protestant Reformation, 
The figure of Martin Luther remains central 
of this there can be no doubt • (3) 
The order in which the three studies are presented, Palamas first, 
then Aquinas , then Luther, is fairly arbitrary. Palamas is 
considered first because of the relative simplicity of his theology , 
which makes his view of nature and grace a very clear initial study. 
Aquinas follows and this juxtapositioning should show some of the 
theological background to the schism between Catholic and Orthodox 
churches. This schism had already taken place by the time of Palamas 
and Aquinas; but their theology reflects the nature of the schism 
quite clearly. Luther is considered third, mainly because this is 
chronologically appropriate, Luther having lived two centuries after 
the other two theologians. 
A chapter will be devoted to each study , and the sections into which 
these chapters will be divided will be the same. At the outset , a 
brief outline of the theological context of the theologian being 
studied will be given. The intention of this section will be to show 
the formative influences on the theologian and to highlight the 
theological battles that the theologian was engaged in • Important 
movements within the church and challenges from beyond the church 
will be dealt with to show what it was that the theologians were 
reacting against as they set out their positions. 
Having done this , the theologian's view of what human nature is will 
be presented. There will generally be two points at issue here • The 
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first is to determine what exactly the theologian feels constitutes 
human nature, and the second is to determine what the theologian 
feels are the limits of human nature • These questions will not be 
handled systematically in exactly this form, but they are the basis 
of these sections of each chapter. 
Then, following on from this, there will be a description of the 
theologian's view of the human condition • Given a certain definition 
of human nature, what is the central problem or predicament which 
confronts people? This will depend , to a degree, on the notion of 
the limits of human nature. It should be borne in mind that this is 
the basis of the concept of salvation, because a predicament implies 
a solution , and the notion of salvation is the Christian 
understanding of the solution to the human predicament • 
This will be followed by an outline of the view of grace which the 
theologian adopts. The definition of grace , the way or ways in which 
grace operates, the divisions of grace and the most important terms 
used in conjunction with the word "grace" wi 11 be considered. All 
these issues must be seen as arising out of the basic concern to 
discover how the theologian believes God can be said to affect a 
person's life. 
At this point enough will have been shown to consider the 
relationship between nature and grace • The issue here will be to 
discover whether there is an intrinsic connection between the 
theologian's view of what human beings are and his view of God's 
effect on humans • It will be at this crucial point in each study 
7 
that concepts like 11 synergy 11 , 11 deification 11 • 11 habit 11 • 
11 sanctification 11 • 11 imputed righteousness 11 and "justification" will 
be explained. They are terms which characterise the approaches of the 
three different groups to salvation. which is the solution of the 
human predicament. 
In the light of these preceding sections, Jesus and the church will 
be brought into the discussion • In the case of Jesus I intend to 
consider only the specific question of the role played by Jesus in 
the salvation of people. This topic will be discussed purely with a 
view to showing the implications of the theologian's understanding of 
nature and grace. If humans are fundamentally like this • and God 
acts like this, then how do the actions of the particular person 
Jesus fit into the picture? In this context the essential emphases 
of the three traditions • namely deification • sanctification and 
justification will be indicated • 
The understanding of the church will be handled in the same way. 
Given this view of human beings and this view of God's activity, what 
is the role of a specifically Christian group of people? 
Each chapter will conclude with a summary of the positions of the 
various theologians. At this point in each chapter I will extract the 
essential points being made by the theologians. 
This is, in broad outline, the structure which will be adopted in 
each chapter. As the point of the study is not to prove the 
superiority of any of the three groups • the term "church", which 
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wi 11 be used from now on instead of "group", wi 11 always start with a 
small initial letter. This is to avoid giving the impression that one 
or two of the theologians belongs to th~ right "Church" while the 
other or others merely belong to "churches". 
An important point to clarify at the outset is the scope of the 
studies • The term "grace" in particular has been used in theology in 
conjunction with a very large number of other terms. This is of 
course inevitable as it is a fundamental term, but it raises a 
problem of selection when it comes to analysing the term grace 
itself. For example the question of predestination is very often 
treated in the context of a discussion of grace • For reasons of 
space I have decided not to consider the question of predestination 
at all, just as I have not dealt with the ways in which law and grace 
are related . or opposed in Aquinas and Luther. An in-depth treatment 
of the specific terms nature and grace is preferable. 
The terms "East" and "West" will be used frequently. In the 
pre-Reformation period "East" is generally synonymous with Byzantine 
Orthodox and "West" is generally synonymous with "Catholic". In the 
post-Reformation period of Luther if the term "East" is used it will 
be synonymous with "Orthodox", and if the term "West" is used it will 
be specified whether the reference is to "Catholic" or "Protestant". 
The terms "Orthodox" , "Catholic" and "Protestant" also need to be 
explained. "Orthodox" refers to the Byzantine, Slav and Russian 
church of the Seven Councils, often known as the "Eastern Orthodox" 
church. The use of the term Orthodox does not imply that the other 
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churches are heterodox. "Catholic" refers to the Roman Catholic 
church. The use of the term Catholic does not imply that the other 
churches have no val id claim to universality. "Protestant" refers to 
all the churches which stem from the sixteenth century Reformation, 
thus including both Evangelical and Reformed traditions. The terms 
used are labels of convenience , chosen for their brevity and 
identifiability. 
Gregory Palamas, despite his authority in the Orthodox church , is 
not very well known amongst Catholics and Protestants. There are very 
few English translations of his own works and very few commentaries 
on his work. The correction of this is due almost entirely to the 
work of John Meyendorff , himself an Orthodox priest. While his work 
in this field is of inestimable value, it leaves non-Orthodox with 
the problem of not having access to debates about the interpretation 
of Palamas which are so important a part of reaching clarity in 
theology. This is mentioned to explain the reliance on Meyendorff in 
the chapter on Palamas. It goes without saying that the same 
methodological problem does not arise in the cases of Aquinas and 
Luther. 
In the Patristic era the term "person" was used in the sense of a 
mask (persona) , the appearance of a thing • Palamas and Aquinas used 
these categories of thought and distinguished between "person" and 
"nature" very carefully. Luther tended to avoid such a clear 
distinction, and his approach is closer to the modern tendency to use 
the term "person" in such a way as to include "nature". In this 
dissertation care will be taken not to confuse these usages 
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anachronistically. 
In the Conclusion the various emphases of the three traditions will 
be juxtaposed and , as far as possible , harmonised in an outline of 
a comprehensive theology of grace • In the course of this the 
question whether there was a discernible historical progression which 
might suggest a necessary logical development in the theology of 
grace from the earlier Aquinas and Palamas to the later Luther will 
be briefly considered • 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE THEOLOGIANS. 
It is not my intention to go into great detail here, but it is 
important to show briefly some of the background in the Christian 
tradition of the three theologians. 
Firstly it must be stressed that these three theologians should not 
be assumed to be powerful presences in each other's backgrounds. What 
is meant by this is that Palamas, for instance, was not writing 
specifically in reaction to Aquinas, although he was aware of him. 
Aquinas preceded Palamas chronologically, but their theological 
contexts were different , and Aquinas did not form Palamas , either 
positively or negatively. Luther's primary preoccupation was with the 
reformation of Catholicism, and in view of this he was not directly 
concerned with Palamite Orthodoxy at all. Aquinas , by virtue of 
being one of the pre-eminent Scholastics, was criticised by Luther. 
It is this connection that may be of considerable importance in 
understanding Luther, and so it can be said that Aquinas, to a 
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certain extent, formed Luther negatively in so far as Luther reacted 
against his theology. 
Secondly the question of the roots of these theologians in the 
tradition must be addressed. For Palamas the theology of Pseudo 
Oionysius, the Cappadocian Fathers (4) and above all Maximus the 
Confessor (5) were the formative figures. For Aquinas the formative 
Christian influences were Augustine of Hippo and Pseudo Oionysius 
(6), while the pre-Christian philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle 
influenced him. For Luther , who was trained in the Nominalist 
tradition that stemmed from Ockham, Augustine of Hippo, a reading of 
the Apostle Paul and to some extent the Rhineland mystics were 
for mat i ve. (7) 
Two points need to be made about these influences • Firstly, they 
were all complemented by exhaustive knowledge of the Bible. All three 
theologians were trained in a monastic or quasi-monastic environment 
in which the Bible was a staple intellectual diet • This seems so 
obvious as almost not to be worth stating , but it is surprisingly 
often overlooked. Secondly, very few of the above author's works were 
available to these theologians in a thoroughly accurate and reliable 
form. For instance , what is known of Augustine of Hippo today may , 
through no fault of their own , have escaped these theologians • 
With this historical background in mind, it is now necessary to turn 
to the works of the three theologians themselves. 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
( 4 ) 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NATURE AND GRACE IN THE 
THEOLOGY OF GREGORY PALAMAS. 
THE THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF GREGORY PALAMAS. 
Gregory Palamas , who lived from AD 1296 to AO 1359, has long been 
regarded in Orthodox Christian circles as having made a crucial 
contribution to the expression of its theology. This chapter will 
focus on his views of human nature and grace • The implications of 
these views for his ideas about the role of Jesus and the church in 
salvation will be indicated • In order to appreciate the significance 
of his approach to the nature and grace theme , an outline of the 
theological context in which he operated is important. 
In AD 1351 his teachings were formally approved by the Orthodox 
church and he became regarded as one of the doctrinal Fathers of the 
church. He had been a monk in Constantinople, on Mount Athas and in 
Thessalonica, where he was Archbishop from 1347 until his death. As a 
theologian he was well known for developing the theology of monastic 
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spirituality • The monastic theology of Palamas was poised between 
two opposing positions : the naturalism of Barlaam the Calabrian and 
the dualism of the Messalians ( who had roots in Manicheism) • 
Messalianism was dualistic in so far as it taught that only the soul 
could achieve any union with God , while the body and all material 
things were to be regarded as obstacles to true spirituality (1). 
This needs to be stressed, because at the time of Maximos the 
Confessor ( 580-662 AD) such doctrines did not hold much sway in the 
East, and the ways in which Palamas extended Maximos' thought are due 
largely to the pressures these movements exerted. The monastic 
movement , of which Palamas was part, and Messalianism both appealed 
to the same groups in the society and they shared some elements of 
spirituality (2). Palamas was actually accused of Messalianism by 
Barlaam of Calabria at one point in their conflict • 
It was Barlaam of Calabria who represented the naturalist tendency 
which Palamas opposed: nominal ism, humanism and the use of Aristotle 
were its hallmarks. Although not all Palamites were anti-humanist as 
such , those aspects of humanism which threatened theology were 
attacked. Meyendorff has described Byzantine humanism in this way 
(3): 
The humanists, in fact, started from the assumption 
of a sort of autonomy for human reason, and its 
independence in relation to a God whom they 
conceived as some impenetrable and inaccessible 
Essence. The union of God and man, realized once 
for all in the person of Christ, and divine action, 
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effective and real, among humanity regenerated by 
baptism, played no ~ecisive part in their thought. 
It is clear that these movements are at the opposite poles of a 
logical spectrum, and hence that Palamas was fighting his battles .on 
two fronts. Messalianism was dualistic, whereas the humanism of the 
time wa~ reductionist in that in its pure form it denied ·the 
existence and influence of anything beyond the natural realm. 
Palamas' theology was an attempt to show how divine and human persons 
could relate to each other without viewing that relationship in 
dualistic terms. This theology steered a middle course between 
dualist separation of body and soul and naturalist assertion of the 
independence of matter from divinity • Palamas' theology insisted on 
the inseparability of body ind soul and the absolute dependence of 
matter on diVinity • 
PALAMAS' UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE. 
Influenced as he was by Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, Palamas 
often defines theological realities in Apophatic or negative terms. 
This approach to theology proceeds by stating what a thing is not up 
to the point where an intuition of the nature of the reality 
described has been reached. Now this approach affects even Palamas' 
view of human nature • He writes: 
Every nature is as far removed as possible · 
from the divine nature, and is absolutely 
foreign to him: if God is nature, then 
all the other beings are not that ; and if 
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every being different from God is nature, 
he is not that , just as he is not a being, 
if the others are. (4) 
This passage is simply intended to stress the difference between 
human nature and divine nature , so that the relationship between the 
two could be clearly expressed without falling into dualism or 
naturalism. When Palamas becomes more specific and explicit about 
human nature , he shows that he identifies with the Byzantine 
Orthodox tradition. 
That tradition understands man as 
an "open being", naturally possessing in 
himself a divine "spark" and dynamically 
oriented toward further progress in God ••• (5) 
This "open being" has fundamentally three elements, body, soul and 
spirit (or "mind, nous"). Body and soul are inseparable and the 
survival of the soul after aeath depends upon the resurrection of the 
body. This position was adopted by people like Maximos the Confessor 
against any Platonic notion of the liberation of the soul from the 
body. (6) The soul in this conception must be taken to mean that 
which animates the person : it is the vital principle. 
The vital principle "impels" the human being towards God • The human 
becomes a "closed" being insofar as he or she remains sinfully 
ignorant of the ways of God • Palamas uses death as a metaphor for 
separation from God caused by such ignorance • He thus sees death in 
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two ways , literally and metaphorically • 
After the transgression of our ancestors in 
Paradise ••• sin came into life. We ourselves 
are dead and, before the death of the body, we 
suffer the death of the soul; that is to say, 
the separation of the soul from God .(7) 
Now there was a additional element in the traditional anthropology • 
This was the nous : the mind or the spirit. Meyendorff suggests that 
the nous should be understood in three ways. 
(1) The ability which man possesses to transcend 
himself in order to participate in God; 
(2) The unity of man's composite nature when it 
faces his ultimate destiny in God and in the 
world; 
(3) The freedom of man , which can either fully 
develop if it finds God or becomes defective 
if it submits itself to the body. (8) 
The nous is the rational element of the soul , and it is ihi~ which 
distinguishes humans from other kinds of creature because Palamas 
holds that other kinds of creatures can have souls • 
This interpretation is advanced because in the sources from the 
period the terms for soul and mind (or spirit) are neither synonymous 
nor very clearly distinguished. It would seem that they are as 
inseparable as body and soul , and that leaves us with what is known 
as a trichotomist anthropology consisting of body, soul and spirit. 
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The notion of the person as the image and likeness of God reminds us 
that the Byzantine view of human nature was positive and optimistic. 
Palamas stresses this; 
The Word became flesh to honor the flesh, 
even this mortal flesh ; therefore, the 
proud spirits should not consider themselves, 
and should not be considered worthy of greater 
honors than man , nor should they deify themselves 
on account of their incorporeality and their 
apparent immortality. (9) 
Palamas also uses the term "heart" in talking about the spirituality 
of the person. The term conveys the idea of the focal point of all 
personal energy , and hence the threshold of spiritual upliftment. If 
a person could reach the "heart" , the integration of the various 
components of the person's nature would be effected. Thus "heart" is 
a term used analogically to describe the integrating core of the 
person. The term's history lies partly in the writings of Pseudo 
Macarius, who rejected the Platonic categories of Evagrius in favour 
of the less dualistic biblical categories. Due to the importance for 
this view of the unity of body, soul and spirit, a psychosomatic 
method of prayer known to the hesychasts or monks of Byzantium had 
been developed by people such as Pseudo Macarius and Nicephorus. This 
involved a combination of disciplined breathing and concentration 
which would open the person up to God. Barlaam of Calabria opposed 
the method, and Palamas defended it. 
Thus our heart is the place of the rational faculty, 
the first rational organ of the body • Consequently, 
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when we seek to keep watch over and correct our 
reason by a rigorous sobriety, with what are we to 
keep watch, if we do not gather together our mind, 
which has been dissipated abroad by the senses, and 
lead it back again into the interior, to the selfsame 
heart which is the seat of the thoughts? This is why 
the justly named Macarius immediately goes on to say, 
"It is there one must look to see if grace has inscribed 
the laws of the Spirit." Where but in the heart, the 
controlling organ, the throne of grace, where the mind 
and all the thoughts of the soul are to be found? 
Can you not see, then , how essential it is that 
those who have determined to pay attention to 
themselves in inner quiet should gather together 
the mind and enclose it in the body, and especially 
in that "body" most interior to the body, which 
we call the heart ? (10) 
PALAMAS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE HUMAN CONDITION. 
The question underlying this section is "what are the basic 
problematic features of human existence that are solved by the 
Christian experience of grace? The predicament of humanity has to be 
considered in the light of Palamas' definition of human nature • 
Although Palamas had a positive and optimistic view of human nature, 
this does not imply that this is untainted. He distinguishes 
carefully between the human condition as it is meant to be (in the 
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temporal realm) and as it actually is. Palamas used the familiar 
method of saying that human nature has fallen through original sin 
from a condition of pristine excellence into a state of sin and 
death. As Meyendorff puts it: 
To understand Palamas' thought about sin and 
death, it is necessary correctly to analyse 
his use of the word "nature". For him "nature" 
is not a static conception , but must always 
be considered in one or other of its 
existential states. Its state before the Fall 
implied life in God, for which it had been made, 
although that life was not its own , but that of 
God; this was essentially the "natural" state of 
nature; after the Fal 1 , deprived of that 1 ife, it 
was left to rely on its own powers alone , a condition 
basically contrary to its destiny, and involving 
death. (11) 
Palamas , in common with the whole Orthodox tradition , differs in 
emphasis from the Western view of original sin • He places much more 
emphasis on death as a consequence of original sin than he does on 
guilt .Fear of death gives rise to an urge toward self-preservation. 
This basic attempt to preserve one's self in the face of death is so 
deeply rooted that it undermines attempts at self-abandonment time 
and again. This undermining of one's best intentions is labelled 
"passion" by Palamas. This concept is often taken to be synonymous 
with either "lust" or "suffering" but these are not the meanings 
ascribed to the word by Palamas. Passion is essentially any concern 
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with self-preservation rather than with God. The problem is that 
people after the Fall seem on the whole to be incapable of concerning 
themselves with anything other than self-preservation in the face of 
death .This passionate attempt to preserve one's self leads to 
further corruption of the person's capacity to perceive the things of 
God. For Palamas, sin is essentially ignorance , which obscures the 
radiant light of God • This ignorance is symbolised by phenomena such 
as darkness , sleep and death • 
This in broad outline is the Palamite assessment of the human 
condition. He describes the consequences of the Fall in this way: 
We hold within ourselves the images of the logoi 
which reside within the creative Intelligence. 
But why have these images from the beginning 
proved ineffective? Is it not because of sin, 
and also because of ignorance and scorn of 
divine commandments? Why do we need teaching 
to see these images, although they are inscribed 
within us? I sin not because the passionate part 
of the soul, roused to commit evil, has corrupted 
them? Is it not because it has overthrown the 
power of sight of the soul , and driven it away 
from its primal beauty? (12) 
At this point it is appropriate to recall Palamas' idea of the death 
of the soul. He uses the concept as a metaphor for separation from 
God , the consequence of sinful ignorance of the ways of God • To 
suffer the death of the soul is for Palamas to be trapped in the 
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cycle of self-preservation , ignorance and corruption. For instance 
Adam's soul 
was put to death •• for it separated itself from 
God; but in a bodily sense it remained alive for 
nine hundred and thirty years ••• , but the death 
which the soul had suffered through transgression, 
not only made the soul unprofitable and man 
accursed, but also subjected his body to many 
sufferings and evils, and made it corruptible. (13) 
It is not clear whether the human predicament was primarily a problem 
facing the individual or whether it was a problem facing the 
community as a whole. It could be assumed that Palamas' espousal of 
the hesychast eremeticism led him to focus on the individual more 
than on the community, but that may impose on Palamas an 
anachronistic distinction between individual and community. Although 
he does not deal with this theme explicitly, it is reasonable to 
suppose that Palamas might point to private prayer as the locus of 
the individual's response to his or her predicament and to the 
liturgy as the locus of the community's response, and that the one 
cannot be effective without the other. ' 
Despite the power of sin and corruption, the dignity of the person is 
never obliterated, and it is in fact the liturgy which safeguards it. 
As Meyendorff puts it: 
The central role of man in the cosmos is also 
reflected - better perhaps than in any system 
of concepts - in the Byzantine liturgy with its 
emphasis on the union of heaven and earth, its 
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sacramental realism, its rites of blessing 
food, nature and human life, as well as in the 
affirmation that, by nature , man is closer to 
God than are the angels themselves • The idea 
originates in Hebrews 1:14, and is developed 
by Gregory Palamas in the context of an 
Incarnational theology •••• (14) 
PALAMAS' VIEW OF GRACE. 
In the above discussion of human nature and the human predicament, 
the point was being made that Palamas did not assume that the human 
being was an entirely autonomous entity. The human was an open being, 
made up in such a way that divinity was reflected in its limited 
nature. Humans were also caught up in a network of sin which all but 
trapped them into obscuring their natural openness. Now to describe 
people as fundamentally open raises the question of what they are 
open to • 
What, then, is Palamas' view of grace? Once again it is the apophatic 
method that Palamas uses often that will clarify his concept of 
grace. 
• •• the monks know that the essence of God transcends 
the fact of being inaccessible to the senses , since 
God is not only above all created things, but is even 
beyond Godhead. The excellence of Him who surpasses 
all things is not only beyond all affirmation , but 
also beyond all negation; it exceeds all excellence 
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that is attainable by the mind. This hypostatic light, 
seen spiritually by the saints, they know by experience 
to exist , as they tell us , and to exist not symbolically 
only , as do manifestations produced by fortuitous events; 
but it is an illumination immaterial and divine, a 
grace invisibly seen and ignorantly known. What it is 
they do not pretend to know. (15) 
This rich passage contains a number of terms which are crucial for 
understanding Palamas on grace : essence, light, knowledge by 
experience and illumination. These terms are crucial for Palamas 
because spiritual knowledge was described in terms of being illumined 
by God's light. This raises the question of whether it was possible 
to experience divine illumination by knowing the essence of God , and 
this in turn raises the question of whether God's essence was 
revealed to persons by grace. (16) 
Thus it is clear that Palamas could only talk about grace if he 
answered the question of how God related to persons. This is because 
that relationship is precisely what the language of grace is all 
about • 
This grace is in fact a relationship, albeit not 
a natural one; yet it is at the same time beyond 
relationship, not only by virtue of being 
supernatural, but also qua relationship •••• 
But as to the essence of God, that is unrelated, 
not qua relationship, but because it transcends 
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the supernatural relationships themselves. Grace 
is communicated to all worthy of it , in a way 
proper and peculiar to each one , while the 
divine essence transcends all that is participable. (17) 
The significance of this passage depends on Palamas' very important 
distinction between the essence and energies of God. He developed 
this distinction to show how God could remain transcendent while 
being involved in the experience of creatures. The subtlety of the 
theory can be appreciated in the light of the fact that the 
nominalist humanists tended to deny human experience of a 
transcendent divinity , while the dualists tended to deny that a 
transcendent deity could have anything to do with contingent reality. 
Palamas refuted both positions by arguing that God's essence was 
beyond anything conceivable or knowable , but that his energies , 
such as 11 love 11 , 11 truth 11 or "light" are the ways in which he reveals 
himself to humanity • 
But you should not consider that God allows 
Himself to be seen in his super-essential 
essence, but according to his deifying gift 
and energy, the grace of adoption, the 
uncreated deification, the enhypostatic 
illumination. (18) 
It is important to stress at this point that while Palamas 
distinguished between the essence and energies of God, he at no stage 
tolerated the idea that they were separable. God was fully present in 
each and all of His energies, and they did not represent either 
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lesser mediations of parts of divinity nor intermediate beings of any 
sort. Grace is God's deifying gift of Himself, given as an energy. 
Palamas deals with the question of grace at many points in Ih~-
Icia~~. which was written against Barlaam the Calabrian. He does not 
deal with the theme systematically, rather it is allowed to touch 
upon every other theme he considers. In the conclusion to the chapter 
on "Apophatic theology as positive experience", he says (19) 
So the Fathers tell us that the divine grace 
of the suprasensible light is God. But God 
in his nature does not simply identify himself 
with this grace, because he is able not only to 
illumine and deify the mind, but also to bring 
forth from non-being every intellectual essence. 
The point of this is to stress that God's grace is not bound by any 
necessity , and that its scope of operation is limitless. 
Palamas goes on to describe the Hesychast method of prayer , 
stressing the transformation of the body by the energies of God. The 
dual purpose behind this stress was , of course , to counteract the 
dualism and reductionism prevalent at the time. If God really was the 
cause of the discernible transformation , then the nominalist 
position would have to be adapted , and if it was really the human 
body that was transformed then the dualist denigration of matter and 
the human body would also have to be corrected. Palamas puts it as 
follows:(20) 
••• this spiritual grace in the heart, alas , you call 
"fantasy of the imagination, presenting to us a 
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deceptive likeness of the heart." However, those 
judged worthy of this grace know that it is not a 
fantasy produced by the imagination, and that it does 
not originate with us , nor appear only to disappear, 
but rather it is a permanent energy produced by grace, 
united to the soul and rooted in it , a fountain of 
holy joy that attracts the soul to itself, liberating 
it from multiform and material images ••• 
This position underlines Palamas' stress on the real , intrinsic 
activity of grace within the person. Grace is not an illusion or a 
product of the imagination but an energy of God which can be 
participated in by people. 
A term that in Palamas is generally synonymous with grace is 
"deifying light". Palamas tends to use images and analogies a great 
deal. This is a consequence of the apophatic approach he inherited 
from Pseudo Dionysius, and its effect today is that it is sometimes 
difficult to identify the precise meaning of terms he uses. Having 
distinguished between the essence and energies of God, Palamas faced 
the criticism that the energies of God were created realities and 
therefore distinct from God. This criticism was raised by Palamas' 
opponents , who were trying to show Palamas' infidelity to Orthodoxy 
by accusing him of slipping into Orthodoxy a misunderstood version of 
the Western doctrine of created grace in the guise of divine 
energies. This however was not the case - Palamas did not accept any 
suggestion that grace could ~xist independently of God and still 
really be grace. It is in this context that he used the image of 
light. 
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You might as well claim that God is a creature , 
as declare that his essential energies are 
created! For no intelligent man would say 
that the essential goodness and life aL~ the 
super-essential essence of God. The essential 
characteristic is not the essence which 
possesses the essential characteristics. As 
the great Denys says , "When we cal 1 the 
superessential mystery "God" or "Life" or 
"essence", we have in mind only the 
providential powers produced from the 
imparticipable God." These, then are the 
essential powers; as to the Superessential ••• 
that is the Reality which possesses these 
powers and gathers them into unity in itself. 
Similarly, the deifying light is also essential, 
but is not itself the essence of God. (21) 
In this context it is important to stress that the deifying light 
experienced by people is an energy of God and is not itself the 
essence of God • 
In conclusion it must be said that Palamas does not develop his 
doctrine of grace as systematically as many of the Western 
theologians do. The divisions of grace that are so important in the 
Thomist outlook are not developed in Palamite thought. Meyendorff 
argues that Palamas accepts the concept of "created grace" but that 
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this should not be regarded as synonymous with what Meyendorff calls 
the "created supernatural" of Aquinas. It seems to me that the 
interpretation is an inaccurate one , as it misunderstands the 
Western notion of the "created supernatural" and also because it 
reads too much into this passage from Palamas, who was simply trying 
to stress the importance of clarity when one uses the word 
Sometimes it is the object given gratuitously 
which is called grace, but sometimes it is 
the very act of giving; at other times neither 
of these senses apply to the word "grace" which 
designates , so to say , the beauty, the 
beautiful appearance , the ornament and the 
glory of each nature, and in that sense we 
grace: 
speak of the grace of words and of conversation ••• (22) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURE AND GRACE. 
In the thought of Palamas it is very difficult to define and analyse 
the concepts "nature" and "grace" independently of each other • 
Nature is by definition open to God's grace , and grace effects the 
salvation of nature known in Orthodox theology as divinisation 
<Theosis). The consequence of this is that co-operation between 
nature and grace is a vital element of Palamas' thought. The term 
generally used to name this co-operation is "synergy". Victor White 
has summed up the impression that this phenomenon of the 
inter-relatedness of nature and grace makes as follows: 
The Eastern approach , as I understand it , 
so far from opposing grace to nature , tends 
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rather to emphasise what may be called "the 
naturalness of grace" and "the graciousness 
of nature 11 • (23) 
It is important not to read too many ontological implications into 
what is essentially an attempt to stress the mutual orientation of 
nature and grace. Grace can be said to lay hold of human nature and 
to transform it , not because it is closed off to goodness itself but 
because it is caught in a cycle of sin and death that prevents it 
from functioning as it should. Grace does not violate nature in 
redeeming it. Rather, it draws out and magnifies the good tendencies 
and suppresses the evil in nature. The good tendencies of nature 
co-operate with grace in the salvation of the person. It is this sort 
of co-operation that synergy implies. As Meyendorff puts it (24) 
All along man's road from his fallen state 
to union with God, divine grace helps him 
to overcome corruption, then to surpass 
himself, and finally shows God to him. 
This "synergy" of grace and human effort 
is for Palamas an obvious axiom. The 
effect of grace is "to establish the inner 
powers of soul and body, and make them act 
in conformity with their nature". 
<Ib~_Icia~2 1,3,15). But that is only a 
secondary aspect of our redemption, the 
goal of which is to make us contemplate 
God, that is to say to surpass ourselves. 
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Nature and grace co-operate in a dynamic process in which human 
efforts at contemplation of God , together with the deifying action 
of grace lead to the deification of the human being • Grace instils 
the "inner powers" of humans and then co-operates with those powers • 
There is a striking emphasis in Palamas on the dignity which God 
accords human beings • God does not , according to Palamas , ever 
force the salvation of humans ; rather it is a question of humans 
deepening their knowledge of God in harmony with grace • As this 
dynamic process progresses the human "image and likeness" of God is 
more clearly manifested • 
By ••• taking up again the Patristic conception 
according to which "nature" does not possess an 
autonomous existence , but supposes grace and 
communion with God, in order to fulfil its own 
true destiny , Palamas affirms that the likeness 
too is an effect of grace while presupposing 
the collaboration (synergy) of man: hence man 
needs God to attain the likeness, but God can 
on 1 y give what man accepts • • • (25) 
In order to gain a clearer understanding of the relationship between 
nature and grace according to Palamas it may be useful to contrast it 
with with the Western phenomenon of Semi-Pelagianism, which was a 
doctrine of the relationship between nature and grace which accorded 
a greater role to grace than Pelagius had done , but which fell short 
of Augustine's emphasis on grace .Semi-Pelagianism has been defined 
as follows: 
Semi-pelagianism divides salvation between 
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God and man in a primitive synergism: man 
begins his salvation by his own unaided 
powers ; then God responds to this independent 
II good wi 11 11 by granting the grace to 
complete the work of salvation • (26) 
Now one of the differences between this and the Palamite position is 
that the Palamite approach is not "primitive synergism". Palamas 
would not accept that man begins his deification by "his own unaided 
powers" he begins his deification by his natural powers but he only 
has the capacity to actualise these powers because of the grace of 
God • The vi ta 1 po i n t i n a 1 1 of t h i s i s t hat accord i n g t o Pa 1 ama s 
nature and grace co-operate throughout the process of deification • 
NATURE, GRACE, DEIFICATION AND THE CHURCH. 
Christian theology has a superabundance of terms to describe the goal 
of humanity • Today , words like redemption , salvation and 
liberation are used , each with different nuances of meaning • In the 
Byzantine era , Orthodox theology used words which have been 
translated as "deification" and 11 divinisation 11 • The basic point that 
is involved in all these terms is that Christianity asserts that the 
gap between persons and God, which is the gap between creatures and 
creator, can and will be and has been bridged, and that this 
"bridging the gap" is the person's real goal. I have chosen 
specifically to consider the question of the role Jesus has or had in 
enabling people to "bridge the gap". Palamas' account of the role of 
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grace and nature in deification will be set out , and then some of 
the implications of these ideas for the role of Jesus will become 
clearer, as will the role of the church. 
Human nature , mind (spirit) , body and soul is transformed by grace 
and co-operates with that grace in the process of deification. The 
energy of God involved in deification is also described in Palamas as 
the "grace of adoption". The grace of adoption is what leads man to 
become God by participation , and when that occurs it does not mean 
that the person's nature has been changed into God's, it means that 
the natural energies are so permeated by the divine energies that in 
a sense people have become gods by participation in the energies of 
God. (27) This of course never means that the divinity is ever 
"reduced" to the scale of humanity • In the case of the incarnation 
of the second person of the Trinity the human and divine wills and 
energies were not confused. Incarnation is not simply synonymous with 
deification however , for Palamas' often repeated warning that in 
deification one is not talking about unity of divine ~22~0~~ and 
human nature. Incarnation differs from the deification of other 
people because the subject of the Incarnation, the Second Person of 
the Trinity is God by essence and not by participation • The link 
between incarnation and deification lies in the Cappadocian idea that 
God became man so that man might become God. 
In one of his ~amili~2 , Palamas succinctly expresses his view of the 
redemption • (28) 
By a single death , that of his own flesh, 
and by a single resurrection , that of 
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that same flesh, he has healed us from a 
double death and delivered us from a 
double captivity , that of our soul and 
that of our body • 
Some of the points in this brief statement need to be elaborated so 
that their importance is clear. When Palamas places the burden of the 
redemption on the death and resurrection of Jesus , he is avoiding 
any idea like that of Peter Abelard in the West of an exemplary 
theory of atonement • In terms of the exemplary theory Jesus' moral 
excellence serves as an example to inspire his followers, and his 
death and resurrection do not have any intrinsically redemptive 
effect as they do in Anselm's theory of the atonement • Because guilt 
and moral excellence are not the fundamental problem and virtue 
respectively for Palamas, neither Abelard's nor Anselm's theories 
could help. For him the fundamental problem was the mortality that 
stems from original sin , and the consequent cycle of sin which 
tempted and trapped human nature • It follows then that to solve this 
fundamental problem people must overcome death and the instinct of 
self-preservation • Jesus , by being resurrected after dying 
voluntarily accomplished both and thus broke the power of death for 
people. 
Thus the whole work of redemption is conceived in 
terms of death-life , corruption-immortality • We 
have seen above that the transmission of Adam's 
sin was essentially understood by Palamas as a 
hereditary corruption entailing at the same time 
mortality of the flesh and sinfulness; the 
voluntary death and resurrection of Christ delivered 
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man from this vicious circle of death and sin • (29) 
Persons are linked up to the triumph over death that Jesus' 
resurrection gained by being baptised into the church. Baptism 
secures the resurrection of the individual's soul because the meaning 
of baptism is inclusion in the "body of Christ" , which is to be put 
in touch with the power that overcomes death and sin • Meyendorff has 
described Palamas' view of this. (30) 
In this perspective , death and mortality are 
viewed , not so much as retribution for sin , 
••• as means through which the fundamentally 
unjust "tyranny" of the devil is exercised 
over mankind after Adam's sin. From this 
baptism is a liberation , because it gives 
access to the new immortal life brought into 
the world by Christ's Resurrection • The 
Resurrection delivers men from the fear of 
death , and , therefore , also from the 
necessity of struggling for existence • 
The effort required of people in their deification is to open 
themselves up to grace so that they can experience the deifying 
"Light". This light has three aspects. There is the divine uncreated 
light that Jesus is ; intellectual light by which to see truth ; and 
created light by which to see material objects • Deification involves 
the permeation of the person by all three forms of light , and the 
image most often used to express this is the Transfiguration. The 
importance of this li'es in the fact that for Palamas Jesus , the 
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church and deified people have an iconic significance which is 
typical of the whole of Palamas' theology • The light of the grace of 
God transfigures human nature , transforming it into an icon or 
"picture" that enhances the deification of others • As Kallistos Ware 
put it : 
God is Light , and therefore the experience of 
God's energies takes the form of Light. The 
vision which the Hesychasts receive is (so 
Palamas argued) not a vision of some created 
light , but of the Light of the Godhead Itself -
the same Light of the Godhead which surrounded 
Christ on Mount Thabor • This Light is not a 
sensible or material light , but can be seen 
with physical eyes (as by the disciples at the 
Transfiguration) , since when a man is deified, 
his bodily faculties as well as his soul are 
transformed. The Hesychasts' vision of Light 
is therefore a true vision of God in His 
divine energies ; and they are quite correct 
in identifying it with the Uncreated Light of 
Thabor • (31) 
For individual Christians the response to grace is nurtured and 
shaped by their participation in the Church • Baptism includes them 
in the "body of Christ" , and the Eucharist is bread and wine changed 
into the "body of Christ" received by the faithful at communion • It 
is the celebration of the eucharist which is the main expression of 
the church's life for Palamas, and to participate in the eucharist is 
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thus one of the most effective ways of being "put in touch with" 
Christ. 
Apart from this sacramental participation , which explicitly 
symbolises and actually promotes the synergism between nature and 
grace , there are other practises which facilitate deification which 
can only be performed in the context of the church, either because 
they are communal and ecclesial by nature , such as liturgy , or 
because without the Church the individual would not have known of the 
practice • An example of the latter would be the psycho-physical 
method of hesychast prayer , which purifies the mind of all sensible 
and insensible images so that the person is more receptive to grace • 
Contemplation and prayer are guided by spiritual directors , and the 
study of scripture is made possible by the commentaries other 
Christians have written • The sacramental life depended on priestly 
ministry , and moral purification could only be guided and understood 
in the context of relationships with other people, including other 
Christians. The church , in short puts individuals in touch with the 
Orthodox Tradition , and this tradition shapes the experience and 
understanding of its adherents. 
Writing on Palamas , Mascall points out that 
Thus, he insists that progress in the Christian 
life is the fruit of the sacrament of baptism 
and that it takes place within the sacramental 
life of the Church; that the whole man , body 
and soul together , is deified by grace through 
his union with Christ ••• (32) 
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SUMMARY. 
In his theology Palamas opposed both dualism and naturalism. His 
anthropology consisted of body , soul and mind (or spirit). The 
latter was the rational element of the soul. Palamas' concept of 
human nature conceived of persons as essentially open beings , 
dynamically orientated towards God. His view of human nature was very 
positive and optimistic , in spite of the effects of original sin. 
The soul , which was the vital principle of the person , was known in 
spirituality as 11 the heart" , and this was for Palamas the "throne of 
grace 11. Before the Fall human nature experienced life 11 in God 11 , 
participating freely in the energies of God. After the Fall human 
nature became subject to death , an instinct for self-preservation , 
passion and sin (which was essentially ignorance of the ways of God), 
but despite this the dignity of the person is not obliterated. 
Palamas distinguishes between the essence and the energies of God 
When God communicates Himself to humanity it is by energy and not as 
essence. Grace is one such self-communication , and it establishes a 
relationship between persons and God's energies. 
Nature and grace cannot be defined separately , because nature is by 
definition open to and dependent upon grace , while grace presupposes 
nature and perfects it in the process of deification. Grace and 
nature co-operate and the name given to this co-operation is synergy. 
Palamas' view of the role of Jesus in deification did not bear a 
resemblance to the Western theories of 11 example 11 and 11 satisfaction 11 • 
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These theories assumed that guilt was the fundamental consequence of 
original sin , and tried to show how Jesus removes human guilt , 
either by serving as the example of a sinless life or by 11 repaying 11 
to God the debt incurred as a result of sin. For Palamas, however , 
the fundamental consequence of original sin was death , and so 
redemption was for him first and foremost a matter of overcoming 
death. Jesus' resurrection from the dead is central, his role being 
primarily to break the power of death , so that others could avoid 
the egoism of self-preservation in the face of death. 
As the church is the 11 body of Christ" , by being baptised and 
included in the church one is put in touch with the power that 
overcame death. Participation in the eucharist is the main way that 
one takes part in the life of the church • The church puts 
individuals in touch with tradition which shapes the experience and 
understanding of adherents • 
The word 11 divinisation 11 ( theosis ) sums up Palamas' theology of 
nature and grace • Through synergy nature and grace co-operate to 
divinise the human creature • 
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NATURE AND GRACE IN THE 
THEOLOGY OF THOMAS AQUINAS. 
THE THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THOMAS AQUINAS. 
Thomas Aquinas , who lived from 1225 to 1274 , taught theology as a 
member of the mendicant Order of Preachers which had been founded by 
Dominic de Guzman only a generation before Aquinas began his studies. 
This is significant because the mendicant orders embodied a view of 
Christian life that was somewhat different from regular diocesan or 
monastic structures. Unlike diocesan clerics , mendicants could be 
sent by their order from diocese to diocese to do specialist work 
such as preaching in the case of the Dominicans and also teaching in 
the specific case of Aquinas • Unlike monks who took a vow of 
stability and lived enclosed lives , the mendicants had much greater 
mobility • They lived together in community , but went out each day 
to go about their various tasks • This flexibility and openness 
threatened many people , particularly when Aquinas and his fellow 
Dominicans and the Franciscans took over from the diocesan clergy as 
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the instructors at the university of Paris • Aquinas was deeply 
committed to the engaging openness of the new lifestyle , and this is 
reflected in the engagement with the world that is evident in his 
theology • 
A particular example of this engagement with the world was his 
encounter with the philosophical and theological trends of the day. 
The dominant theology was an other-worldly , supernaturalist theology 
which tended to view natural things negatively • On the other hand , 
there was the secularism of the "Latin Averroists" like Siger of 
Brabant , who used Averroes' rendition of Aristotle as the basis for 
their secularist view of natural things • Aquinas tried to avoid 
these two problems by arguing that natural reality is good , and 
further that its goodness stems from its origin , which is God. To 
expand on this , it is clear that Aquinas wanted to stress to its 
limits the capabilities of nature , and at the same time to stress 
the dependence of nature , for its real activity , on God. To this 
end , Aquinas did not hesitate to use the insights of Aristotle's 
philosophy , but he did so critically. At this time the theological 
agenda also included grappling with the problem of the schism between 
Catholic West and Orthodox East and how to overcome it • This 
involved, among other things , a close consideration of the doctrine 
of the Trinity , due to the "filioque" controversy • 
AQUINAS' UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE. 
In considering Aquinas' theological context , the question of 
Aristotelianism arises • Aristotle was "discovered" by Western 
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Christians in the generations just before Aquinas.In most cases the 
translations available had made their way from Greek via Syriac and 
Arabic to Latin, and were thus not always very reliable • The 
contribution of the Muslim scholar Averroes was crucial in one of 
these translations , and it was his interpretations of Aristotle that 
were followed by the group known as the "Latin Averroists". Aquinas 
was not satisfied with their results , and commissioned his own 
translations of Aristotle .To do this , he had an expert on Greek do 
a direct translation into Latin • However , all this did not mean 
that Aquinas accepted Aristotle uncritically • 
Schillebeeckx , among others , has pointed out that there is strong 
evidence of Arabic and Nee-Platonic thought in Aquinas , particularly 
in his understanding of human nature. (1) We have already seen that 
the range of influences on Aquinas' thought is very complex , but it 
is enough to say here that when defining what a human being is , 
Aquinas does not simply opt for the Aristotelian tradition over 
• against the Platonic tradition. Briefly put , the Aristotelian 
tradition held that the soul is to the body what form is to any 
matter , while the Platonic tradition saw matter as somehow a shell 
containing the soul. Aquinas tried to steer something of a middle 
course between these two positions by accepting the essential 
relationship between soul and body of the Aristotelians and the 
notion of the soul's survival of the body's death of the Platonists. 
Copleston has summarised clearly how this was accomplished.(2) For 
Aquinas all living things had souls , in so far as they all had vital 
principles • What distinguished humans from animals was that in the 
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case of humans the soul was rational. The rational soul was what made 
the human being human , and it was the vital principle informing the 
matter of the human body • Aquinas held that soul and body were 
inseparable , forming one composite whole , an individual human 
being. Thus when a human dies , its material elements disperse but 
his or her soul survives as the vital principle awaiting the 
resurrection of the body. 
Aquinas takes the soul to be "the first principle of life in living 
things about us" (3) , as we have seen above • The question now 
arises concerning the nature of the soul • The fundamental property 
of the human soul is that it is a rational soul • Aquinas is careful 
to show that having a rational soul does not mean that humans have 
three souls , vegetative and sensitive as well as rational (4) • 
Humans have only one soul , the rational , which animates the thought 
and activity of the person .This rational soul has distinct 
faculties, however , and these are of great importance • They are 
sensation , intellect , emotion and will (5) • Emotions < or 
"passions" as they are usually called in Aquinas (6) ) and sensations 
are faculties that the human person has in common with animals , 
while intellect and will are the specifically human faculties. The 
integration of the human being depends on the freedom with which the 
will and emotions are moved to act in accordance with the truths 
known by the senses and intellect. 
By accepting a basic distinction between intellect and will Aquinas 
does not imply that the two can be separated but that their 
operations can be distinctly seen , as for instance when a person 
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knows something should be done but cannot summon the will to do it • 
The intellect is superior to the will • and the explanation for this 
reveals more of Aquinas• definitions of the terms • Intellect and 
sensation enable people to "apprehend" things • to know them (7) • 
Emotion and will • on the other hand • enable people to strive 
towards objectives; they are the "appetitive" powers (8). Now 
Aquinas bases his argument that the intellect is superior to the will 
on the premise that it is better to have something in mind • to know 
something. than it is to merely have something as an object to strive 
towards.(9) 
The anthropology outlined above does not simply exist in a fixed 
static state. it has certain orientations • These are not two 
contradictory understandings of what human nature is • but two 
different aspects of the concept. In itself "nature" is the principle 
of motion • but motion implies an object and human nature is never 
simply "in itself". It is always related to other beings (10). 
The view of what a human being is that arises out of these strands is 
as follows • For Aquinas human beings are naturally "in motion" • 
that is oriented towards objects. Objects are here understood as 
goals rather than material things (11). This sense of "motion" 
includes the notions of growth and all the other developments in 
animal and vegetative capacities. Secondly • for Aquinas human beings 
are naturally open to other natures • be they animal • human • 
angelic or divine • Human beings have a natural orientation to God • 
and this is what makes descriptions of nature as open to supernature 
significant (12). This openness is not unqualified : without divine 
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assistance humanity cannot reach divinity • There is a slight 
difference of emphasis between Aquinas and Palamas on this point 
Palamas attributes a greater role to human initiative in the process 
of "reaching" divinity • 
It is the distinctive feature of man's "nature" 
that he is open to an end which is only within 
his reach by the assistance of God's grace • (13) 
The soul cannot simply be identified as part of nature • It is the 
rational principle of life , and as such it integrates the natural 
capacities of the human being • It is not , therefore , one of those 
natural capacities itself ;it is spiritual and incorruptible and is 
directly created by God , which for Aquinas is another way of saying 
that it is not naturally or materially generated (14) • The human 
being, then , is made up of natural capacities of growth and openness 
as well as of a rational soul with its faculties of sense and 
emotion, intellect and will. The latter integrate and orientate the 
former to their ends , and it is at this point that the question of 
the human condition or predicament becomes vital • 
AQUINAS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE HUMAN CONDITION. 
In discussing Aquinas' doctrine of the human condition it is very 
important to distinguish between ontological and moral categories , 
since it was the former that primarily occupied Aquinas' attention 
rather than the latter (with which Luther was particularly 
concerned). By an ontological category I mean a concept that deals 
with the essential constitution or being of humanity , while a moral 
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category deals with what humanity is disposed to do , given a 
particularly ontology • This is not to suggest that Aquinas regarded 
moral questions as unimportant ; he simply worked on the assumption 
that moral life is based upon an ontological foundation • Hence the 
human condition is determined at its deepest by the ontological 
structure of human life , particularly the limitations of human 
nature • The limitations that humans share with all created natures 
are the limitations of space and time (15) • The really crucial 
limitation they are subject to is that by virtue of having a rational 
soul and a natural orientation to God , humans are aware that their 
goal lies "in God", but they have not the capacity to reach that goal 
of themselves (16) • Now this perspective is somewhat different from 
that of , for instance , Luther • The latter focusses on the moral 
and existential concerns of sin and guilt , while Aquinas focuses 
more on ontological problems • For Aquinas human nature before and 
after the Fall remains fundamentally the same • Sin does not change 
human nature as such it disrupts the harmonious subordination of 
sense and emotion to intellect and will. People do not lose the 
capacity for God - its fulfilment is made more difficult by sin (17). 
The fundamental problem for humanity is thus rooted in human 
ontology. People have a capacity for God but cannot realise it of 
themselves. Kenny expresses the same point slightly differently.(18) 
In the 13th century , Thomas Aquinas , while not 
neglecting man's sorry beginnings , turned resolutely 
forward towards man's end , the beatific vision • Hence 
he delivered a superior theology of elevating grace : 
we need God's self-communication not first and foremost 
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because we are sinners , but more radically because we 
are not God , but puny creatures called to interpersonal 
communion with the three-personal God in heaven. 
Having considered this view of human nature and the human condition , 
it is necessary to consider the orientation of supernature to human 
nature , or in the theological shorthand of Aquinas , to consider the 
grace of God, 
AQUINAS' VIEW OF GRACE, 
There is a problem of selection in considering Aquinas' view of 
grace.This is because the theme is handled in a large variety of 
contexts in his writings , and also because many different terms are 
used to describe Aquinas' doctrine of grace • 
The Catholic tradition stemming from Aquinas has spawned a large 
number of terms in its theology of grace • It is sometimes difficult 
to penetrate that tradition and unearth Aquinas' precise concerns • 
Hinwood argues that there are basically ten contexts in which the 
concept of grace is used by Aquinas,(19) i,e. the orientation of all 
people in and to Christ; salvation history and its elements; the 
mystical body of Christ; the adopted divine sonship; the working of 
the Holy Spirit; the indwelling of the Holy Trinity; participation in 
the divine nature; love; qualities of the created soul and the 
nature-grace structure. 
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To this I would add the question of predestination , but this may 
have .been excluded on the grounds that it falls under the heading of 
"Salvation history and its elements" or that it is handled by Aquinas 
as a sub-section of the "nature-grace structure". At any rate our 
concern is more with the nature-grace structure than with any of the 
other sections. 
Mascall has also analysed a range of terms used in the Catholic 
tradition's theology of grace , and what he says of this range 
applies equally well to the range of terms used by Aquinas in his own 
theology of grace : 
all these dualities and contrasts arise from the 
mysterious truth that grace relates personal God and 
personal man.(20) 
Before considering Aquinas' technical terms , it is important to 
remember that grace is understood in three basic ways in Aquinas 
firstly as God's self-offer to people , secondly as God's actual 
influence on people, and thirdly as the virtues , habits and 
dispositions which result from God's influence • 
It should be clear , in spite of all these distinctions , that grace 
itself is not divided up. It is not a thing. The distinct ways of 
describing it are based on the different ways in which humans 
experience grace. 
The distinctions that Aquinas used can be summarised as follows. 
There were two basic kinds of grace :"freely-bestowed grace" and 
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"sanctifying grace••. Freely-bestowed grace was the grace by which 
humans he 1 ped at her humans to sa 1 vat ion ; it was 11 non-sanct if y i ng 11 in 
the sense that it had no effect on one's own salvation. Sanctifying 
grace consisted of operative grace , in which God alone acted , and 
co-operative grace , in which God and human beings acted together. In 
this co-operation God was the primary cause and the human soul was 
the secondary cause • Sanctifying grace was also divided into 
prevenient and subsequent grace, according to the order of the 
effects of sanctifying grace. For example , conversion may precede 
growth in holiness , hence the grace which brings conversion is 
prevenient to the subsequent grace which brings growth in holiness 
< 21) • 
Haight (22) and Laporte (23) have produced interesting analyses of 
Aquinas' ways of describing grace • These are that grace is 
11 elevating 11 , 11 sanctifying 11 and 11 justifying 11 in its effects on the 
human ; that grace is "created 11 and "supernatural 11 ; and f i na 11 y that 
grace is a 11 habit 11 • It is necessary to explain how these often 
confusing terms are applicable to Aquinas. 
Grace is elevating This means that the function of grace is to 
11 lift 11 , as it were, a lower nature to the level of a higher nature. 
Human beings cannot of themselves realise their capacity for God , 
hence grace ••comes from•• God and enables humans to realise their 
capacity for God.(24) 
Grace is sanctifying : This means that grace really transforms the 
human being , fulfilling their capacity for God • Another way of 
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saying this is that through grace the human being participates in 
God, This notion of participation in God may seem out of place given 
the "intellectualism" of Aquinas , but for Aquinas intellectualism 
implied possession of an object by the soul's intellectual faculty 
that "object" could be God, Today intellectualism tends to imply 
abstraction rather than participation • For Aquinas the reality of 
the sanctifying elevation of nature by grace was fundamental • 
••• just as it is impossible for anything to make 
fiery but fire alone , so it is necesary that God 
alone should make Godlike, by communicating a share 
in his divine nature by participation and assimilation. (25) 
For Aquinas it is the intellect that is the human component of this 
participation and assimilation • 
Grace is justifying : This means that grace transforms the human from 
being in a state of sin to being in a state of sanctification • This 
is described in terms of regeneration but this should not be taken 
to mean that human nature is supplanted • In Aquinas' view it is 
transformed by grace • 
Grace is created : The purpose of this description is to stress the 
doctrine that grace operates inherently within the human being. 
Created grace is nothing other than the grace operative within 
creatures, and the term is not meant to imply that Aquinas thought 
grace could ever exist independently of God. 
Grace is supernatural This simply stresses the transcendence of God 
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in relation to humans by asserting that grace does not originate from 
human nature but from divine supernature • This is closely linked to 
the concept of superadded grace • the "adding on" of. grace to human 
nature • The reason why grace is superadded to human nature is that 
human beings are unable of themselves to attain their supernatural 
goal • 
Grace is a habit : This means that grace has a real effect on the 
dispositions of the human being • God has created human beings in 
such a way that they are in a habitual state of openness to God • 
Although this openness is part of human nature • it is an effect of 
grace insofar as it is created by God • 
Grace ••• is a kind of habitual state which is 
presupposed by the infused virtues • as their 
origin and root. (26) 
Moeller and Philips use this concise definition of grace as a habit 
••• the habitus is an active tension set up by God 
at work in man • (27) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURE AND GRACE. 
When it comes to the specific question of the realationship between 
nature and grace it is revealing to see how Aquinas builds on the 
position of Augustine • Augustine thought of grace as the healing 
power at work within humans to overcome the effects of sin Now while 
Aquinas agrees with this. he takes the work of grace to a deeper 
level by seeing grace as that which elevates a lower nature to its 
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supernature • This is not simply another way of describing the 
healing of sin , it is a shift in the context within which grace was 
considered. For Augustine the context was morality , whereas for 
Aquinas it was the logically prior context of ontology (28). In 
other words grace affects the very being of the human , not only 
their inclinations and actions • 
The relationship between nature and grace is not dealt with by 
Aquinas in a special question in any of his works. Rather it is a 
question he deals with in relation to other fundamental problems as 
they arise. This is not to say that he regards it as unimportant 
the opposite is true. In the very first question of the Summa_ 
Ib~alagia~ on the nature of Christian theology , Aquinas writes 
Since grace does not scrap nature but brings it to 
perfection , so also natural reason should assist faith 
as the natural loving bent of the will yields to 
charity.(29) 
Elsewhere Aquinas writes that grace presupposes nature (30), that 
11 grace is proportioned to nature as the perfecter to the perfectible 11 
(31) and that "Nature is the preamble to grace 11 • (32) 
These statements (33) show that Aquinas thought of nature as needing 
grace to reach its proper end , and of grace as using the capacities 
of nature , perfecting and transforming them rather than supplanting 
them. The subtlety of Aquinas' position becomes clear when it is 
recalled that he uses two different concepts of nature without 
contradiction. He used the Aristotelian concept of a being's 
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constitution and the Nee-Platonic concept of a being's place in the 
hierarchy of being • His view of the necessity of grace avoids the 
dangers of a Pelagian view that nature could of itself achieve its 
supernatural end. This is significant because his use of the 
Aristotelian concept of nature's orientation towards and capacity to 
reach its proper goals could have tempted him into a Pelagian 
position. On the other hand , his view of the openness of nature to 
its supernature avoids the temptation , to which many other 
scholastics fell prey , to view nature as closed off from 
supernature, and hence grace as something imposed onto a resistant 
nature. This is significant because it shows how Aquinas saw grace 
and nature as co-operating in harmony. 
Gilby (34) has summarised Aquinas' insight succinctly: 
The supernatural does not derogate from the natural, 
but witnesses to our human dignity , for if impotent 
of ourselves to scale the heights, our impulse is 
towards them. It is this nobility that grace takes , 
and makes capable of glory. 
The general description of the way in which grace and nature 
co-operate according to Aquinas is as follows (35). The human being, 
moved by its rational soul , is aware of both its supernatural goal 
and of the fact that , of itself , it cannot attain that goal • 
••• by his natural endowments man cannot produce 
meritorious works proportional to eternal life , 
but a higher power is needed for this , which is 
the power of grace • (36) 
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To use some of Aquinas'categories, it is important to stress that the 
initial awareness of the supernatural goal is itself the result of a 
"prevenient" movement of grace in the soul. The growth towards God 
that is offered wi 11 be a "subsequent" movement of grace if the human 
being accepts it. God's grace is always offered whether the human 
wants it or not. When it does have an effect on the human being 
without the co-operation of their rational soul , then it is called 
operative grace. These effects are not the most common way in which 
God's grace works; they are of the order that people would regard as 
"miraculous". 
The ordinary way in which Aquinas thought grace and nature 
co-operated was this : sanctifying grace is the grace by which human 
nature is elevated to divine supernature • It is the created grace 
which works within creatures, establishing a permanent disposition in 
the soul which orients it to its supernatural goal • This permanent 
disposition is known as a "habitus" or habit • Aquinas stressed the 
co-operative action of grace and defined it as God and the rational 
soul co-operating for the salvation of the human. This co-operation 
did not reduce God to a cause among other causes in the universe, but 
saw God as a primary cause moving the soul as a secondary cause to 
its end. In this case the secondary cause , the rational soul , has 
will as a component. Therefore , co-operative grace involves God 
activating the human will , which can only function effectively and 
freely the more it is activated by God , its origin and sustainer. As 
there is not the space to go into this question in much more depth , 
suffice it to say that "freedom" in this context does not mean 
freedom from God , but freedom from the constraints of other things 
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and creatures • In Aquinas God does not threaten human freedom 
precisely because of his view of the harmony of nature and grace. The 
human being is not a puppet subject to divine manipulation , but a 
thinking and willing being who owes any movement towards the 
supernatural goal to a grace which respects human nature and gives it 
its capacities without supressing nature. (37) 
To summarise Aquinas' view of the relationship between nature and 
grace, Mascall's comment is interesting: 
It is clear that in St Thomas' mind not only does 
nature need grace if its possibilities are to be 
realised , but also grace needs nature as the 
material in which it is to work. Without nature 
grace would be left in a vacuum and would be an 
unreal fiction, for the function of grace is to 
supernaturalize nature. Or , in less abstract 
language , grace elevates man into the life of God.(38) 
NATURE, GRACE AND SANCTIFICATION. 
"Sanctification" is perhaps the term which best expresses Aquinas' 
theology of salvation • From the above it might appear that salvation 
is simply a matter of grace elevating nature to supernature, but 
Aquinas was by no means insensitive to questions of where people 
could see evidence of grace elevating nature, and how people could 
be encouraged to be receptive to grace, and why Jesus in particular 
was necessary for salvation. In the context of a discussion on the 
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cause of salvation, Aquinas writes: 
There is a twofold efficient agency : namely, 
the principal and the instrumental. Now 
the principal efficient cause of man's salvation 
is God. But because Christ's humanity is the 
instrument of the Godhead, all Christ's actions 
and sufferings act instrumentally in virtue of 
his Godhead for the salvation of men. And so 
Christ's passion achieves man's salvation effectively. (39) 
The two statements , that grace is of God and that Christ's humanity 
is the instrument of the Godhead, point to the notion that Christ is 
somehow the instrument of grace • The reception of grace by other 
people thus depends in some sense on what Jesus has done for 
them.(40) For Aquinas , the fundamental contributions of Christ were 
to atone for the sins of humanity, and to "save" simply by coming to 
be known as Lord and God in his teaching and actions (41) • Through 
faith in him, the believer acquires an "intellectual" possession of 
Jesus in the soul. In this way he is transformed by a sharing in the 
properties , the knowledge and the virtues , of Christ. The theory of 
the atonement which Aquinas upheld was basically the "satisfaction" 
theory of atonement which had been developed by Augustine (42) and 
Anselm (43). In fact , although Aquinas taught this doctrine , he 
was open to the current idea that God would have become human even if 
sin were not a factor, so as to identify completely with humanity • 
The theory of Christ's atonement runs as follows in its most commonly 
found forms: Sin is a reality , and people seem unable to subdue or 
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repair the damage they have done. In the state of original justice 
before the fall God was surrounded by obedient rational beings. 
Disobedience to the will of God was the essence of the fall, and sin 
was its heritage. The being which subdued sin and restored the 
obedience of people would deserve their ultimate loyalty. Now it 
would only be appropriate for God to deserve the ultimate loyalty of 
human beings. Therefore only God could redeem man. Unless this 
redemption happened , God's eternal plan of the fulfilment of all 
would be incomplete and God would be deprived of his due honour and 
loyalty. This debt must either be repaid or punishment must ensue. 
Punishment would imply that God's plan had gone awry with no hope of 
restitution , so repayment was preferable, since it would restore the 
divine eternal plan .Now an adequate satisfaction could only be 
effected by God , but it is not God that owes the debt. People owe 
the debt and therefore they should pay it. The impasse can only be 
resolved if someone both human and divine makes satisfaction. Now 
this satisfaction is simply the restitution of due honour - how does 
it help other people in subsequent ages? Christ was the sinless man 
who died voluntarily. God the Father is indebted to Christ because 
the perfect human died voluntarily • The Father cannot repay this 
debt to Christ , because Christ is the fullness of divine incarnation 
and could receive no more from God than he has already. Therefore the 
grace that God the Father offers to Christ "overflows" to others , 
and in the process sin is forgiven and the divine plan is 
restored.(44) 
In Aquinas' terms Christ's atonement is superabundant and not merely 
sufficient : this puts the origin of the "overflow" of grace in the 
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perfection of the Son rather than the indebtedness of the Father. 
Aquinas held that Christ could offer God an infinite satisfaction for 
sin by virtue of his divinity , and by virtue of his humanity he 
could offer an appropriate human satisfaction. In this way he was the 
perfect mediator between God and humanity (45) • However, the basic 
thrust of the argument is the same as that of Anselm and others. 
He atones appropriately for an offence who offers 
whatever the offended one equally loves , or loves 
more than he detested the offence. But Christ 
by suffering out of love and obedience gave to 
God more than was required to compensate for the 
offence of the whole human race •••• And so 
Christ's passion was not merely a sufficient but 
a superabundant atonement for the sins of the 
human race : according to "He is the propitiation 
for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for 
those of the whole world" (1 John 2:2). (46) 
The voluntary death and resurrection of Jesus , the perfect human , 
destroys the power of sin and leads to the perfection of human 
capacities in him and their union with God. The conquering of sin is 
only important for Aquinas insofar as it enables human nature to 
reach its proper end , God , by removing the negative power which 
inhibits the intellect and will from doing good • 
Although the notions of honour and debt can and should be seen in the 
context of medieval feudal assumptions about contracts , the vital 
point is the respect shown in the theory for the integrity of grace 
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and of nature. God could simply redeem humanity at will , but because 
of divine respect for human capacities, this is not done. Clearly, 
Aquinas' adherence to the satisfaction theory of redemption is 
implicit in his view that grac• does not scrap nature but perfects 
it • 
THE CHURCH'S ROLE IN SANCTIFICATION. 
For Aquinas the church was the historical expression of the presence 
of Jesus. He maintains a very close link between the work of Christ, 
grace, salvation and the church • 
••• the grace of Christ (is) transmitted to all 
begotten of him spiritually by faith and baptism. 
And this concerns not only the removal of the sin 
of their first parent, but the removal of actual sins 
and the attainment of glory (47) 
The church is thought of as the body of Christ, and the life of the 
body of Christ is characterised by signs which indicate the process 
of salvation that occurs and which instrumentally cause sanctifying 
grace • These signs are of course the sacraments, and in Aquinas they 
are the expression of the Church's life. There are two questions that 
are concerned here : why does Aquinas see the sacraments of the 
church as necessary for salvation , and in what sense does his view 
of the sacraments of the church follow from his view of nature and 
grace? 
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For Aquinas , participation in the sacraments is of fundamental 
importance: 
Strictly speaking , a sacrament is that which is 
directed towards signifying our sanctification. 
There are three aspects here : the cause itself 
of our sanctification, which is Christ's passion; 
the form of our sanctification, which is grace and 
the virtues; and the ultimate end of our 
sanctification , which is eternal life. And all these are 
signified by the sacraments. Therefore, a sacrament 
is a sign that is both a reminder of the past, i.e. 
Christ's passion; an indication of what is achieved 
' in us through Christ's passion , namely grace; and a 
prognosis, that is a prediction of future glory. (48) 
For Aquinas sacraments are not simply signs or directions. They 
"cause" grace, not in the sense that they are the origin of grace but 
in the sense that they are secondary or instrumental causes used by 
the primary cause, God as occasions of grace. The grace involved is 
operative grace, rather than the more commonly experienced habitual 
grace. 
Sacramental grace adds something over and above 
grace as commonly defined, and also over and 
above the virtues and the Gifts, namely a 
special kind of divine assistance to help in 
attaining the end of the sacrament concerned. (49) 
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Grace is 11 in 11 the sacraments insofar as they are signs and 
instrumental causes. The sacraments are necessary for salvation 
because they signify salvation and give rise to the grace by which 
God achieves salvation for people. Aquinas says of the link between 
Christ's redemption and the grace of the sacraments that 
••• it is right that the power to bestow salvation 
should flow from the divinity of Christ through his 
humanity into the actual sacraments. (50) 
In what sense does Aquinas' view of the sacraments of the church 
follow from his view of nature and grace? There are two senses in 
which it follows, theoretical and practical. Theoretically , the very 
notion of the sacraments as instrumental causes of grace reminds one 
of the role of the mind in co-operative grace and the role of other 
persons in freely bestowed grace • The point is that God , 
supernatural to creation, moves created beings and includes them in 
the movement of grace • God does not use the sacraments in the same 
way as co-operative and freely bestowed grace , as we have seen 
above, but it is significant that the matter of creation is used as 
an occasion for grace. This again shows how Aquinas saw creation as 
being respected by God, particularly with regard to its laws of 
operation • 
Practically , the use of familiar, natural things such as water , 
bread and wine in the sacraments also shows how Aquinas' view of the 
sacraments follows from his view of nature and grace. The very fact 
that his eucharistic theology is one of transsubstantiation and not 
consubstantiation reflects this, because he is concerned with the 
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intrinsic transformation of human nature , not with an extrinsic 
mixing of human and divine. 
SUMMARY. 
In his theology Aquinas opposed both secularism and the denigration 
of matter and human nature. Hence in his concept of human nature he 
wanted to stress both its dependence on God for its existence and its 
inherent goodness. In his understanding , humans have a natural 
desire for God and are naturally oriented towards goals and open to 
other natures. The human being is composed of a rational soul and a 
body which relate to each other as form does to matter in the 
Aristotelian framework • 
The rational soul consists of intellect and sensation < the 
apprehensive powers) , as well as will and emotion < the appetitive 
powers). The will and the intellect comprise the rational element of 
the soul which distinguishes it from other kinds of creature • 
In assessing the human condition Aquinas focuses more on ontological 
questions than existential ones. The human being is naturally open to 
God and oriented to God , but has not the capacity to "reach" God by 
his or her own nature. For Aquinas this predicament is logically 
prior to that of sin, for instance , because an understanding of the 
very nature and principles of functioning of human capacities 
precedes an understanding of how these capacities might function 
sinfully. 
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Although the goal of humans is God, they cannot reach their goal of 
themselves. Therefore if God is to be 11 reached 11 human nature must be 
divinely assisted. This divine assistance is grace • In Aquinas grace 
is understood in three related ways. It is God's self-communication 
to people, God's actual influence on people, and the virtues, habits 
and dispositions which result from God's influence. The connection 
between these three understandings is this : God comes to be known by 
people because of the divine self-communication. This knowledge gives 
rise to virtues and dispositions in people which operate habitually. 
This grace sanctifies individuals in two ways: as co-operative grace 
God and the rational soul work together , and as operative grace God 
works without the co-operation of the soul. When this sanctifying 
grace initiates a process of salvation it is called prevenient grace, 
and if the process continues subsequent grace is involved. When 
individuals help others to salvation they do so by what Aquinas calls 
freely-bestowed grace. 
Aquinas held that grace presupposes and perfects nature • Grace 
presupposes the openness of nature and perfects it by enabling it to 
reach its divine end • Grace and nature co-operate as primary and 
secondary causes leading to sanctification by transforming the 
personal dispostions. 
Jesus was the perfect example of a human whose dispositions were 
unfailingly oriented to God. As the perfect human his voluntary death 
had the effect of repaying the debt owed to God by humanity for sin. 
God's grace , given in response to this act , 11 overflows 11 from Jesus 
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to other people for their salvation. What this means, for Aquinas, is 
that Jesus, the perfect human who rose from the dead, saves simply by 
coming to be known as Lord and God, and in this way shares his 
qualities and dispositions with us. 
The church makes Jesus present to individuals, since it is the 
historical expression of the presence of Christ. The sacraments are 
constitutive of the church in Aquinas' view. They "cause" grace 
instrumentally and enable the individual to participate in the "body 
of Christ". 
The word "sanctification" sums up Aquinas' theology of nature and 
grace • Grace sanctifies nature , completing it and enabling it to 
reach its proper divine end • 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NATURE AND GRACE IN THE 
THEOLOGY OF MARTIN LUTHER. 
THE THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF MARTIN LUTHER. 
Martin Luther (1483 - 1546) stood at the beginning of the Protestant 
Reformation and remains today one of the strongest formative 
influences on Protestantism. In 1505 he joined a branch of the 
Augustinian monastic order at Erfurt , and was ordained a priest in 
1507. This detail is important , because his membership of this order 
exposed him to the thought of Augustine of Hippo. 
At the time of his training the Scholasticism associated with people 
like Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas was on the decline, and 
the Nominalist theological movement that stemmed from Ockham was very 
powerful. Luther reacted against the "decadent , withering and 
soulless scholasticism" (1) of his day. Nominal ism was such a 
pervasive movement at the time that it shaped the very categories in 
which one thought. For this reason Luther's theology bears many of 
the marks of nominalism, despite his criticisms of some aspects of 
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the movement .Nominalism has been described as a positivist theology, 
concerned with facts, historical particulars and tradition. It had 
little enthusiasm for the scholastic natural law tradition and was 
hostile to metaphysics. (2) Accordingly, Luther opposed what he felt 
was an undue emphasis on the metaphysics of Pseudo-Dionysius and the 
"natural theology" which used the philosophy of Aristotle so much. 
Rondet has suggested that 
It was nominalism that governed his interpretation 
of Augustine, and it governed still more his 
interpretation of St. Paul • (3) 
One of the distinctive features of Luther's theology was its personal 
quality • His experience of tension between the justice of God and 
his own sinfulness shaped his theology • He was concerned about his 
experience of the fruitlessness of doing things in order to earn 
salvation. In traditional theological terms , he was opposed to 
Pelagianism, and this explains why he was so attracted to Augustine 
of Hippo, one of the great opponents of Pelagianism. It also explains 
why Luther was so influenced by Paul the Apostle, because the 
latter's use of categories like "law" and "flesh" as opposed to 
"gospel" , "spirit" and "grace" was aimed at explaining why it was 
futile to try to merit salvation • 
LUTHER'S UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE. 
Luther accepted the Pauline anthropology of body ,soul and spirit, 
and insisted on stressing the unity of the "whole man" • However, the 
terms body soul and spirit are not the terms Luther generally used • 
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They reflect a cohcern with ontology which Luther did not share • His 
concern was with the existential predicaments of people, and it was 
because of this that he wanted to show how it was that people could 
either be on the move towards salvation or away from salvation • The 
terms he used to show this are "flesh" and "spirit". 
These terms have been misunderstood often by being taken as 
synonymous for "body" and "soul". To avoid this inaccuracy Luther 
emphasised that the "whole man" , body , soul and spirit, could be 
subject to the flesh or to the spirit. For instance , if a person is 
thoroughly self-centred and carnal 
••• the whole man is flesh, for the spirit 
of God does not abide in him. (4) 
Most people are , for Luther , "simul justus et peccator", 
simultaneously justified and sinning. This means that the whole 
person , body , soul and spirit is tempted by two different objects • 
See how one and the same man, at the same time, 
serves the law of God and the law of sin , is at 
the same time just and sins • For he does not 
say "my mind serves the law of God" nor "my 
flesh serves the law of sin", but he says "I, 
the whole man , the same person , I serve both 
servitudes." (5) 
Luther stresses the unity of the person , rejecting any notion of the 
soul as a separate entity from the body • 
"The flesh" is the whole man , with body and soul , 
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reason and will. And every man has fleshly 
senses , moods , affections and will who is not 
born of the spirit. For the soul is so imbedded 
in the flesh, which seeks to guard and protect it , 
that it is indeed more "flesh" than the flesh itself. (6) 
Althaus has clarified Luther's use of the term "flesh" , saying that 
it is used in the Pauline sense , equivalent to the Greek "sarx". 
Human nature before the Fall is oriented to the spirit of Gad. After 
the Fall however , selfishness and egoism are rife and human nature 
is conditioned by "flesh", indeed "becomes" flesh. 
The pride and self-assertion which prevent a man 
from achieving genuine love either of men or of 
God is not an occasional distortion ; it is the 
nature of fallen man •••• Luther and Paul describe 
this can di t i an by ca 11 i n g man "fl es h" • ( 7) 
"Spirit" is always for Luther the spirit of Gad. For Luther there is 
never any sense in which a person can do or will good of his or her 
own capacities • Once again , the Pauline use of spirit (pneuma) is 
adopted by Luther. 
Luther's general concept of human nature states that it is , (in the 
translation of Tillmans and Preus) "curved in upon itself". This is 
crucially important • Although the ontological and existential 
perspectives on human nature are distinct in Luther, they are 
inseparable. Hence it is true that for Luther human nature was not 
naturally oriented to spirit or naturally open to supernature after 
the Fall. 
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••• our nature has been so deeply curved 
in upon itself because of the viciousness 
of original sin •••• (8) 
It is important to note that Luther's conviction of the depravity of 
fallen human nature does not mean that he regards human persons as 
essent ia 11 y evi 1 before the Fa 11 as we 11 • What he teaches is that 
original sin has so distorted the nature of the person that it is no 
longer oriented to spirit in the way it was before the Fall • 
The image that these ideas suggest is that of a pendulum swinging 
between two points , flesh and spirit. The person is always oriented 
towards the one but restrained by a tendency towards the other • 
There is seldom a time when a person is fixed at either point. Hence 
the language about being justified and a sinner at once • 
It must be stressed that Luther was far mo~e concerned with the 
particular situations and states within which human persons actually 
exist than with human nature as such • He says very little about 
human nature as such , and when he does it is always within the 
context of discussing the human predicament. 
LUTHER'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE HUMAN CONDITION. 
As has been stated , Luther's concern was with the existential human 
condition rather than with ontology. Althaus suggests (9) that the 
distinction between body, soul and spirit is anthropological, 
78 
while that between flesh and spirit is theological. In any event, it 
is the latter to which Luther devotes most of his attention. "Flesh" 
and "spirit" do not refer to human nature as such, but to possible 
existential states to which human nature is subject. In this section, 
four basic themes will be considered, namely sin, guilt, the dondage 
of the will and the need of grace. These themes reflect the tension 
between spirit and flesh. 
Sin : Luther uses the term sin in two inseparable senses : original 
and subsequent. By original sin he means the "sin of Adam", the 
originaldisobedience to God's will. This is the sin which breaks the 
human orientation to will and do good. What I have called subsequent 
sin is simply sin which is committed by individuals as a consequence 
of original sin • Both forms of sin are part of a general condition 
of sinfulness which Luther calls flesh. 
The extent to which individuals are sinners is unknown to 
themselves.This is because sin is such a pervasive reality that it 
distorts a person's self-knowledge • 
••• one must note , particularly at this point, 
the statement that no one can know all his 
sins. This becomes especially obvious when 
one takes alack at the magnitude of original 
sin •••• Truly, therefore, sin is as stupendous 
a thing as He is stupendous who is offended 
by it. But Him Heaven and earth cannot 
contain. Rightly, therefore , Moses calls sin 
a secret thing, the true magnitude of which 
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the mind cannot encompass. Even as God's 
wrath, even as death, is infinite, so sin also 
is infinite. (10) 
The pervasiveness of sin means that even when a person appears to be 
doing good their deed is subverted by egoism. A deed can appear to be 
good on the surface, but at the level of its motivation it is sinful. 
Guilt : In his discussion of the effect of guilt Luther shows very 
clearly his view of the human condition • He describes two 
inseparable states of guilt : the guilt that stems from original sin 
which leaves us incapable of doing good , and the guilt that we incur 
by particular sins. 
The notion of guilt rests on the concept of concupiscence, which 
Luther defines as "that weakness in us toward the good" (11). People 
are incapable by nature of doing the good , and they are thus in a 
state of guilt. hen individuals commit actual sins they incur guilt. 
Concupiscence is so fundamental a part of the human condition that 
Luther can say that persons ac~ concupiscence in the same sense that 
persons are flesh. Persons incur guilt when their wills give in to 
concupiscence, but do not necessarily incur guilt simply by being 
subject to concupiscence. This is the meaning of Luther's notion that 
people can be guilty and not guilty simultaneously. 
In itself the concupiscence is guilty, to be sure, 
but yet it does not render us guilty unless we yield 
to it and commit sin. From this comes the 
remarkable fact that we are guilty and not guilty. 
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For we ourselves are this weakness, therefore it 
is guilty and we are guilty until this weakness 
ceases and is cleansed. But we are not guilty as 
long as we do not act in accord with this weakness, 
since God in His mercy does not impute the guilt 
of the weakness but only the guilt of the will which 
consents to the weakness. This twofold idea cannot be 
better explained than by the parable in the Gospel of 
the man who was left half dead. <Luke 10:30 ff.) (12) 
These ideas are developed in Luther's L~kiUC~2_Qn_BQman2 when he 
discusses the verse "so then it is no longer I that do it but sin 
which dwells within me" (7:17). It is sin which traps the person 
"in" the flesh, and guilt is the objective and subjective result of 
this sin. 
The bondage of the will : This concept was developed in Luther's 
treatise against the humanist Erasmus, D~-S~C~Q-~CbiiciQ• By 
describing the will as being in a state of bondage Luther meant that 
the will freely chooses evil most of the time • The thing which 
tempts the wi 11 to choose evi 1 most of the time is sin. The wi 11 is 
so thoroughly conditioned by sin that it unfailingly chooses evil. 
Original sin , the Fall, means that humanity is guilty of turning 
away from God and becoming egocentric. When individuals commit sins 
they experience this guilt • Luther's contention was that individuals 
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sin all the time , even when they appear to be doing good. For 
instance, good counsel may appear to be altruistically given, but the 
counsellor may derive undue pride from giving others advice. For 
Luther , nothing which a person can do can lead to spirit • Another 
way of putting this is to say that the will is 11 bound 11 to the flesh. 
It cannot do other than choose the flesh, according to Luther. 
All that a person can do to escape this predicament is to submit in 
faith to the will of God and to believe in the gospel of redemption 
in Jesus Christ. As Gonzalez puts it: (13) 
We can only wi 11 evi 1. Our best virtues, 
admirable though they are from the point 
of view of civi 1 law, in no way bring us 
any closer to God. This is not because 
our will is constrained, but because it 
is so imbued with sin that it freely 
chooses evi 1. There is nothing 1 eft in 
us by which we can actively please God 
or even move toward him •••• Nothing is 
left to us of which we can boast. All 
that we still have is the passive capacity 
to be turned in the right direction -
a capacity that is absolutely passive and 
that we cannot therefore turn into actuality. 
But for God this suffices. It is to this 
passive capacity of the will that God addresses 
himself in his Word, turning our will toward him, 
so that once again , even in the midst of our 
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sinful condition, we may have communion with God. 
Luther's doctrine of the bondage of the will poses this question : if 
the will cannot move a person towards salvation , then what can? In 
another form this is the question of the need for grace. 
The need for grace : Sin gives rise to guilt and holds the will in 
its grip. This leaves the person absolutely powerless to do anything 
which could merit God's favour and bring about salvation. Another way 
of describing that powerlessness would be to say that a person needs 
God's freely given help in order to be saved. The help of God must be 
freely given in this sense it is never a reward for human effort. 
Another term for that freely given help is grace. 
Luther challenged his opponents to prove that salvation was possible 
without grace :(14) 
Prove that it is possible by nature to love God, 
as you say , "with all your strength" <Luke 10:27) 
and without any grace. If you are without 
concupiscence , we will believe you. But if you 
live with and in these lusts, then you are no 
longer fulfilling the Law • 
••• when a person desires and loves something 
else, can he really love God? But this con-
cupiscence is always in us , and therefore the 
love of God is never in us , unless it is begun 
by grace •••• 
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Luther's view of the human condition can be summarised as follows : 
as a cosequence of original sin the human race stands in a state of 
guilt before God. The individual experiences this guilt and the 
enslavement of the will to sin. The absolute gap between God's 
righteousness and the person's sin is acutely sensed , and the only 
remedy for the predicament lies in God. This is because all human 
actions are riddled with egoism and hence have no real salvific 
effect. 
LUTHER'S VIEW OF GRACE. 
The fact that Luther was less concerned with ontology than with the 
existential human predicament, allied to the fact that his written 
theology was in the form of commentaries rather than systematic works 
, leaves us without a clear dogmatic definition of grace. This was a 
distinct advantage as far as Luther was concerned, because grace was 
not a thing to be analysed but an initiative to be responded to. 
Before considering some of Luther's own comments on grace as such , 
an outline of his views should be drawn from some of his 
commentators. 
In the context of discussing baptism, Althaus writes :(15) 
Baptism does not give a particular grace, not 
not only a part of salvation , but simply the 
entire grace of God, "the entire Christ and the 
Holy Spirit with his gifts". 
This implies that grace has a very wide definition in Luther, in that 
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it is to do with the expression or self-communication of God to 
creatures for their salvation. Ernst (16) says of Luther's theology 
that 
Here grace becomes above all the experience 
of a God who allows himself to be encountered 
in a face-to-face relationship by one who 
deeply experiences himself to be a sinner. 
Haight, (17) in comparing Luther's doctrine with that of Aquinas, 
shows that for Luther grace is God's favour by which people are 
forgiven .It is never, for Luther, a habit or quality of the soul. It 
is important to bear this in mind when Luther's use of the term 
"co-operative grace" is discussed. 
Rondet raises the vital question of whether the degree of sinfulness 
of a person has any effect on their experience of grace. He regards 
Luther's definition of grace as 
the certainty we have regarding a God who 
looks upon sinful man as though he were just. (18) 
Grace is thus God's favour, available to people at baptism, operating 
to eradicate the guilt and bondage of the will experienced by the 
person • 
In Haight's words, Luther sees grace as 
••• the relationship of friendship and communion 
established by God in spite of a person's sin.(19) 
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For Luther , grace is synonymous with the mercy of God. This mercy is 
shown to the sinner in order that he or she might "die to sin" or 
"turn away from flesh to the spirit". This grace removes the guilt 
that is a consequence of sin , which is another way of saying that 
the debt owed to God as a result of sin is cancelled by grace. As 
Luther himself put it : 
Grace • • • bestows the remission of sins. (20) 
The best known context in which Luther uses the term grace is the 
doctrine that grace alone justifies. Justification is the setting 
right of the relationship between persons and God. For Luther this 
justification cannot be brought about by the actions of people in any 
way because all actions are conditioned by egoism, all will enslaved 
to the flesh. The implication of this is that only God can justify , 
and the justifying act of God is what Luther calls grace. 
For we are not made righteous by doing righteous 
works, but rather we do righteous works by being 
righteous. Therefore grace alone justifies. (21) 
Luther's description of grace is always attentive to the action of 
grace, for instance in his description of how gentiles are saved by 
. being "grafted" onto the "tree" of Israel by grace, despite 
beingnaturally incompatible with the chosen people. He lays great 
stress on the gratuitous quality of grace • It is a gift, and cannot 
be conceived of separately from God's fundamental gift to humanity , 
Jesus. When discussing Paul's Eeisil~_ia_ih~_Bamans (5:15) , Luther 
writ es (22) 
The apostle joins togehter grace and the gift, 
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as if they were different , but he does so in 
order that he may clearly demonstrate the type 
of the One who was to come which he has mentioned, 
namely, that although we are justified by 
God and recieve His grace, yet we do not 
recieve it by our own merit, but it is His gift, 
which the Father gave to Christ to give to men •••• 
But "the grace of God" and "the gift" are the 
same thing, namely , the very righteousness which 
is freely given to us through Christ. And he 
adds this grace because it is customary to give 
a gift to one's friends. But this gift is given 
even to His enemies out of His mercy, because 
they were not worhty of this gift unless they were 
made worthy and accounted as such by the mercy and 
grace of God. 
This quote clearly conveys the idea of God's imputation of 
righteousness into the sinner, which is the primary effect of grace 
for Luther. 
On the whole Luther's view of grace is simple and uncluttered. Grace 
is God's forgiving favour which imputes righteousness to the sinner, 
removing guilt and the bondage of the will to evil. On one of the 
rare occasions when Luther's style moved from pastoral and scriptural 
concerns to more speculative concerns, he has a rather cryptic 
discussion of the distinction between operative and co-operative 
grace. 
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For God first gives operative grace, which He 
allows to be used and worked with up to the 
point where He begins to pour into us a second 
kind of grace; and when this has been poured 
in , He lets it co-operate , even though when it 
was first infused it was operative and first 
grace, while with respect to the first grace it 
is second grace. For it is called first grace 
always with respect to itself, because it 
operates first, and then in the second place 
it co-operates • (23) 
This is cryptic insofar as it is not quite clear with what the second 
grace co-operates and with what the first grace works. In my view 
this cannot mean the same as the Scholastic notion of co-operative 
grace in which grace and the human mind co-operate. This is because 
for Luther the person is entirely passive in relation to God's 
activity • Grace co-operates only with other impulses of grace. This 
speculative point does not modify the basic view of grace outlined. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURE AND GRACE. 
In his commentary on Psalm 51 Luther very strikingly indicates the 
relationship between nature and grace. (24) 
From this absolute God everyone should flee 
who does not want to perish , because human 
nature and the absolute God - for the sake 
of teaching we use this familiar term - are 
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the bitterest of enemies. 
This negative view of the relationship between nature and grace 
stems quite consistently from the view of nature as "curved in upon 
itself" and the doctrine of justification by grace alone. In his 
Qi~euiaiian_again~i_S~hala~ii~_Ihialagy , Luther opposed the view 
that grace presupposes nature and perfects it: (25) 
On the part of man, however , nothing 
precedes grace except ill will and 
even rebellion against grace. 
If human nature is thus closed off to grace, and if grace is to be at 
all effective, then it must somehow act in spite of nature. It is 
this conclusion that gave rise to the language of "imputed 
righteousness" and "extrinsic justification" that is associated with 
Luther's position. What this language means is that grace takes hold 
of the person and heals the effects of sin by cancelling them i~ 
God's eyes. The person is incapable of adequately repenting of sin 
and for this reason grace, and nothing but grace can do the job. The 
person's guilt is erased in the eyes of God, even though he or she 
continues to swing like a pendulum between flesh and spirit , law and 
gospel. The term "extrinsic" in this context means from outside the 
person , with no part of the person co-operating in the process of 
its own accord. In the Qi~euiaiian_Can~icning_Ju~iifi~aiian Luther 
comments on the verse in 8~i~_Qf_ihi_8ea~ili~ where some unclean 
animals were declared clean by God: (26) 
••• as he pronounced those animals clean, 
which according to his own law were still 
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unclean, so he pronounces the Gentiles 
and all of us righteous, although as a 
matter of fact we are sinners just as 
those animals were unclean. 
This concept that people are declared righteous in spite of their 
sinfulness is described by Watson in this way (27) 
Deliverance came through the Gospel, not 
because by it he was enabled to attain 
perfect contrition and secure the grace 
that would make him acceptable to God, 
but because it revealed to him that God 
in His grace freely forgave his inability 
to do so and accepted him, unworthy as he 
was and in spite of his sin. 
Luther's doctrine of imputed justification raises an important 
question : once righteousness has been imputed by God, does it make 
any difference to the everyday experience of the person? Before 
righteousness is imputed, the person is wholly enslaved to the flesh. 
Having been "justified by faith" the person's will is freed from this 
absolute bondage, although the tendencies and temptations of 
concupiscence remain. According to Haight, Luther does assert that 
changes take place in the person's life. This change has three 
fundamental forms: being raised up, freedom from the world and 
freedom for the neighbour. (28) 
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Being raised up : By this is meant the growth in stature of the 
person from being in a state of guilt to being in a state of grace • 
The image of elevation is used to convey the idea that Christ lowers 
himself in order to lift the person up to his level. Luther (29) uses 
th image of the person as the bride of Christ to convey this. It is 
important to state clearly that for Luther God does not change in 
elevating the person :the person is changed by grace. (30) Luther's 
description of the experience is found in Ih~_Ec~~dam_a£_ih~-
.Chci~iian_t1an 
Here this rich and divine bridegroom Christ 
marries this poor , wicked harlot, redeems 
her from al 1 her evi 1, and adorns her with 
all his goodness. Her sins cannot now 
destroy her, since they are laid upon 
Christ and swallowed up by him. And she 
has that righteousness in Christ, her husband, 
of which she may boast as of her own 
and which she can confidently display 
alongside her sins in the face of death 
and he 11 • 
Freedom from the world : This is the relative freedom enjoyed by the 
person in grace. It loosens the bondage of the person to the flesh, 
not so completely that the flesh no longer has any power to attract 
the person, but enough enough to enable the person to tend towards 
the spirit more often than not • The "world" and the "flesh" are 
synonymous here. Put slightly differently, then, grace imbues the 
natures of particular persons with an inner detatchment from things 
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and an independence of spirit. It does not mean that one has a 
godlike control over the things of the world, but it is a disposition 
of freedom in relation to things. To quote Luther: {31) 
••• every Christian is by faith so exalted 
above all things that , by virtue of a 
spiritual power, he is lord of all things 
without exception, so that nothing can do 
him any harm. 
Freedom for the neighbour : This experience is of doing good to other 
persons for their own sake. It is purely for their own sake : if it 
were for one's own sake it would be the pursuit of merit , and if it 
were for God's sake it would , in the view of Luther, not relly be a 
genuine concern for the neighbour. This concern for others for their 
own sake is only possible in grace , because of the utter depravity 
of human nature after the Fall. There are hints in Luther that this 
freedom for the neighbour is only truly experienced by Jesus, but it 
is in principle possible for any person to experience it , given 
grace. As a result of being freed by grace , a person 
may serve and benifit others in all that he does , 
considering nothing except the need and advantage of 
his neighbour •••• Here faith is truly active through 
love, that is , it finds its expression in works of 
the freest service , cheerfully and lovingly done, 
with which a man willingly serves another without hope 
of reward ; and for himself he is satisfied with the 
fulness and wealth of his faith • (32) 
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NATURE , GRACE AND JUSTIFICATION • 
Given the concept of nature as "curved in on itself" and grace as 
God's forgiving imputation of righteousness, and the extrinsic 
operation of grace on nature , it must be judged whether these ideas 
have any specific implications for the role played by Jesus in the 
justification of people • It is a corollary of the notion of nature 
being curved in on itself that people cannot of themselves merit 
God's favour. If God's favour is to be granted to the person then 
someone or something outside of the person must bring that about • 
Now it can only be effectively brought about by God, as Luther has 
stressed. Therefore God's own Word, Jesus, brings this about because 
of his God-given merits, which are expressed in his "being raised up" 
at the resurrection, his "freedom from the world" which enables him 
voluntarily to accept death and his "freedom for the neighbour" which 
demonstrated his lack of egoism. 
How is it that Christ can be part of the extrinsic operation of grace 
on nature? Luther's response to this was to stress that 
justification occurs by the grace of faith alone • If one is given 
the gift of faith, the subjective dimension one receives is hope and 
the conviction that one is indeed declared righteous. The objective 
dimension one receives is the Word, which comes to the individual in 
the forms of Jesus, the scriptures and the preaching of these. Jesus 
is thus present in faith to the believer and is the object of faith 
itself. 
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As regards the question of why it is Jesus specifically who effects 
the salvation of persons , there has been considerable debate about 
Luther's position. G. Aulen (33) advanced a particularly 
controversial theory , distinguishing three types of soteriology 
the "classical", the "Latin" and the "ethical"• The "ethical" type 
was that of Peter Abelard, among others, and in terms of this Jesus 
saves by being the best example of a life perfectly led. The "Latin" 
type was the satisfaction theory of the atonement which (as noted 
above) was developed by Augustine of Hippo, Anselm of Canterbury and 
Thomas Aquinas. Here Jesus , the God-man, pays the debt owed by 
people to God by voluntarily accepting death, and secures grace for 
others because in his perfection he cannot receive any more grace 
from God himself. The "classical" type was found, according to Aulen, 
in the New Testament, ancient Greek theology and in the works of 
Luther. In this theory Jesus saves by reconciling God and people as a 
result of a victorious battle against the "principalities and powers" 
which bind humanity to the flesh. The controversy was over which of 
these positions best reflected Luther's position. Aulen insisted that 
Luther held only the "classical" position. Most interpreters of 
Luther today do not accept this , arguing that Luther combined the 
classical and Latin types, and that although Jesus does not save 
simply by being an example, he nevertheless is an example to 
Christians • It is Luther's combination of the classical and Latin 
positions that is the important point. As Althaus puts it: (34) 
••• Luther combines the classical and the Latin 
concepts - to use Aulen's term - but in such a 
way that he decisively follows the Latin line. 
Luther agrees with the doctrine of the Greek 
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theologians and of the early church when he 
understands the crucified and risen Christ as 
the conquerer of those powers of corruption 
which presently destroy men ; he agrees with 
Anselm in putting Christ's work decisively in 
relationship to God. Both concepts are unified 
in Luther's thought by the fact that he, 
together with Paul, treats the law as one of 
the powers of corruption, and that he sees the 
wrath of God which we feel in our conscience 
as that which ultimately threatens us in and 
behind the demonic powers. 
For Luther, Jesus substitutes for people and takes on their sin and 
guilt although he himself had no sin and guilt. This lack of egoism 
meant that he was free of the flesh. By voluntarily suffering he 
cancelled the debt owed to God by people for sin. His motive for 
doing this was love, and this love was the same thing as God's grace 
and forgiveness of sinners. In Luther's words : (35) 
••• the risen Christ, was delivered up , to death, 
for our trespasses, to destroy them and put them 
to death, and raised for our justification, that 
it might be established and completed. 
Persons cannot, by nature , redeem themselves. Someone or something 
else has to do it for them. The grace or favour of God comes to the 
believer in God's Word • Jesus' voluntary death removed the guilt 
which resulted from original sin, thus restoring the good 
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relationship between God and persons. The grace that saves people is 
available to them in spite of their distorted nature • 
THE CHURCH'S ROLE IN JUSTIFICATION. 
Having seen how Jesus' role in justification is consistent with the 
relationship between nature and grace in Luther's view, the question 
arises as to how it is that people can be put in touch with the grace 
of Christ. 
Although the individual acceptance of faith is crucial , and although 
Luther firmly believed in the priesthood of all believers, knowledge 
of the significance of Christ and the need to turn away from the 
flesh are not , for Luther , reached in a vacuum. They are learnt 
through the preaching of the Word, which is Christ in the Scriptures. 
This preaching is what constitutes the church. 
It is the preaching about Christ, the proclamation 
of the Word; that is constitutive of the Church ; 
for if the Church is the mother of Christians it 
is not the mother , but the daughter of the Word. (36) 
Luther himself stresses the importance of hearing the preaching of 
the Word, on the grounds that it is in that very hearing that ' people 
encounter Christ. 
He who is to find Christ, must first find 
the churches ••• (37) 
Quite simply, Luther's assessment of the importance of the church 
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rests on an association of ideas something like this : the person 
acknowledges his or her sinfulness and participates in the church 
through hearing the Word preached • By being baptised the gift of 
grace is made available, and by sharing in the eucharist 
incorporation in the body of Christ takes place. The fruitfulness of 
all of this depends on grace. Luther uses the image of a hospital to 
convey the importance of the church. 
The church is the inn and the infirmary 
for those who are sick and in need of 
being made wel 1. (38) 
Luther describes the church in various ways : it is the mystical body 
of Christ. the "communio sanctorum" and is "created by wisdom". The 
notionof the mystical body of Christ is the basis of the eucharistic 
unification of the church. It simply stresses the idea that one 
encounters Christ in the Church. The "communio sanctorum'' or 
communion of saints was another idea about the church. 
I believe that there is on earth, through the whole 
wide world, no more than one holy, common Christian 
Church, which is nothing else than the congregation 
or assembly of the saints, i.e. the good believing 
men on earth, which is gathered, preserved, ruled 
by the Holy Ghost and is daily increased by means of 
the Sacraments and the Word of God. (39) 
The notion that the church was created by wisdom is intended to 
stress that the church is God's creation and that God "expresses 
himself" through the Church. 
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Given Luther's insistence that those who would be saved must find the 
church , how is the church to be recognised? There are various marks 
of the church , the principle ones being preaching of the Word, 
baptism and the Lord's supper or eucharist. The latter two are the 
sacraments of the church; Luther did not accept any others. There 
were various other marks of secondary , but by no means minimal, 
importance. These were things like public worship, ministry (to 
ensure and perform the preaching of the Word and the performance of 
the sacraments), authentic disciplinary authority in the community of 
the faithful, and the daily bearing of the cross in uncomplaining 
suffering by the faithful. (40) 
It is in the context of the church , then, that the Christian 
encounters the Word and can receive the gift of faith which leads to 
justification. The church is not, however, a community of perfect 
people. It is a group of people who are sustained together in faith 
but who are nevertheless sinners: they have been freed from the 
tyranny of guilt but are still exposed to the evil of the flesh. 
SUMMARY. 
In his theology Luther opposed what he felt was an undue use of 
metaphysics and natural theology. These he encountered in the 
declining scolasticism of his time. He proposed a more personal 
theology which focussed on the existential experience of people 
rather than on the ontology of human nature. 
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Luther did not pay a great deal of attention to defining human nature 
as such. He viewed human nature as "curved in upon itself" as a 
result of original sin. For him the important question was whether 
the whole person, body, soul and spirit, was preoccupied with the 
"flesh" or with God's "spirit". This is the question of the human 
condition. 
The human condition was to be constantly wavering between flesh and 
spirit. Only Jesus successfully overcame the flesh , and hence for 
all other people the human condition is flesh. Flesh was identified 
as sin, guilt and the bondage of the will. To be subject to the flesh 
meant to freely choose sin most of the time, if not all of the time , 
and to experience guilt as a result. All of this meant that the 
person could do no good without egoism destroying that good. Hence 
the person could do nothing to merit salvation in God's eyes • For 
Luther the human condition was to be conscious of an infinite gap 
between the righteous God and the unrighteous sinner. To be subject 
to the flesh meant to be in need of grace for salvation. 
For Luther it was grace alone which made the person righteous. This 
grace was God's favour, available to people at baptism, operating to 
eradicate the guilt and bondage of the will experienced by the 
person. 
If the person was not naturally open to grace , as Luther taught, how 
could grace effect the person's salvation? By imputing righteousness 
to the sinner extrinsically. What this meant was that the person's 
guilt was erased in the eyes of God, even though he or she continued 
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to swing like a pendulum between flesh and spirit. This extrinsic 
justification changed the person by raising them from a state of 
guilt to a state of grace, by freeing them from undue attatchment to 
material things , and by enabling the person to do good to others for 
their own sake. The basis for all these ideas was Luther's doctrine 
of the bitter enmity between nature and grace. 
What part did Jesus play in the justification of the person by grace? 
There are two senses in which Luther was involved in this , for 
Luther. The objective , historical sense, was Jesus' atonement for 
the sins of humanity and his defeat of the powers of evil and the 
flesh. By voluntarily suffering he cancelled the debt owed to God by 
people for sin. His motive for doing this was love, and this love was 
the same thing as God's grace and forgiveness of sinners. This leads 
on to the subjective sense in which Jesus was important : the grace 
of Christ becomes available to people, in spite of their sin, in 
faith. Faith in Jesus was itself a gift of grace which contributed to 
the justification of the person. Thus Jesus contributes to the 
justification of the person by his past defeat of the forces which 
enslave the person and by his present availability to persons in 
faith. 
Knowledge of the significance of Christ and the need to turn away 
from the flesh were not , for Luther , reached in a vacuum. They were 
learnt through the preaching of the Word, which was Christ in the 
scriptures. This preaching was what constituted the church. The main 
hallmarks of the church were the preaching of the Word, baptism and 
the Lord's supper • 
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The word "justification" sums up Luther's theology of nature and 
grace • Grace justifies people , removing the stain of sin which 
turned human nature in upon itself • 
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In this conclusion I intend to draw out the major implications of the 
three preceding chapters and to show that there are resources in all 
three traditions which should be drawn upon by anyone hoping to 
formulate a complete , comprehensive and dynamic doctrine of the 
relationship between nature and grace • 
The three traditions discussed have revealed important differences of 
emphasis , and there are some terms which effectively summarise these 
differences • It is important to stress that these terms are not 
merely jargon , but that they express real variations in theological 
discourse • These terms are of course "deification" in Palamas , 
"sanctification" in Aquinas and "justification" in Luther • As these 
theologians have had such a formative influence on their traditions 
it seems fair to say that deification , sanctification and 
justification are the key verbal symbols of the theology of grace for 
Orthodoxy , Catholicism and Protestantism respectively • 
In this conclusion , then , I shall briefly emphasise the centrality 
of these terms within the context of their traditions ; following 
this I shall consider the question whether there was a discernible 
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historical progression which might suggest a necessary evolution of a 
complete "vocabulary" for a comprehensive theology of grace • 
Finally, I shall outline what I consider to be a doctrine of grace 
which adequately indicates the roles of Jesus and the church in 
salvation and which draws upon all three major traditions in an 
inclusive , responsible and coherent manner • 
ORTHODOXY AND DEIFICATION. 
The Palamite notion of deification ( theosis) is a term which 
indicates the harmony of nature and grace in Orthodox thought • Human 
nature is optimistically presented as open to the action of the grace 
of God • Grace deifies the human being progressively , and the 
culminating point of this process is the transfiguration of living 
people and the transformation of the dead "into" God • It is 
impossible to use literal language to describe the ultimate 
deification , so Orthodoxy uses two theological methods to 
communicate its position effectively • Firstly , at the abstract 
dogmatic level a distinction is made between the essence and energies 
of God • This enables Orthodoxy to avoid the pitfall of asserting 
that in deification humans become wholly and entirely God , so that 
the distinction between creator and creature falls away • Instead God 
remains essentially transcendent while the deifying energy transforms 
people • As Kallistos Ware has put it , 
The idea of deification must always be understood in the 
light of the distinction between God's essence and His 
energies. Union with God means union with the divine 
energies , not the divine essence : the Orthodox Church , 
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while speaking of deification and union , rejects all 
forms of pantheism (1) • 
Secondly , at a metaphorical level much use is made of visual iconic 
imagery to stress the transformation of people • God's energy is 
often expressed as a light which penetrates , illuminates and 
transforms the human person • It is for this reason that the icon of 
the transfiguration of Christ has such a central place in Orthodox 
iconography : it is the clearest symbol of deification in Orthodoxy. 
CATHOLICISM AND SANCTIFICATION. 
Aquinas' use of the sanctification motif reflects the difference of 
emphasis between Catholic and Orthodox theologies of grace • Aquinas 
held that people could not achieve their divine end unaided • In 
other words , salvation was impossible without grace • Aquinas did 
not teach a doctrine of synergy or co-operation between nature and 
grace as did Palamas • Aquinas rather stressed the tension between 
the human destiny in God and the human incapacity to achieve that 
destiny unaided • Hence in his theology of grace he stressed the 
effect of grace on the human being now rather than the eventual union 
with God • He emphasises the process of transformation more than the 
end-point of that transformation , and it is because of this that he 
goes into such detail about the divisions of grace • Sanctification 
is the key term here • Grace completes , perfects or sanctifies 
nature • This does not mean that for Aquinas there is no co-operation 
between nature and grace , it simply means that in order for such 
co-operation to take place the human beings inability to attain 
divinity must be changed by the divine instrument of grace • This 
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process of change is called sanctification • As Aquinas put it 
Grace is not said to make pleasing or sanctify by an 
efficient but by a formal "making" , such that by it 
man is justified and made worthy to be called pleasing 
to God ••• (2) 
The distinction between efficient and formal causality need not 
detain us here • The important point is that Aquinas sees grace as 
having a sanctifying role , perfecting human nature so that it is 
capable of its divine end • 
PROTESTANTISM AND JUSTIFICATION. 
Luther's doctrine of justification arises out of a pessimistic view 
of human nature • Because human nature is so drastically "curved in 
upon itself" as a result of sin , grace is needed in order for sin to 
be forgiven and in order for human nature to be opened up to its 
divine end • This "opening yp" involves the imputation of 
righteousness that is essential to justification • In other words , 
grace justifies people , forgiving their sinfulness and setting them 
to rights in God's eyes , elevating them and freeing them from the 
world and for their neighbors • There is nothing humans can do to 
cause their own justification , because nature is so corrupted by 
sin. In Luther's own words , 
••• the person is justified and saved , not 
by works or laws , but by the Word of God , 
that is , by the promise of his grace ••• (3) 
/ 
The Protestant doctrine of grace therefore deals not primarily with 
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mystical or ontological questions of deification or sanctification , 
but with what one might cautiously term the moral question of 
justification • This tradition has been concerned more with sin and 
its forgiveness than with ontology or mystical theology • 
THE QUESTION OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 
This is a highly complex question which , although it cannot be 
comprehensively dealt with here , must be given some attention as it 
affects how one goes about presenting a complete doctrine of the 
relationship between nature and grace • 
The question arises in various forms • Is a more recent form of the 
theology of grace necessariy the more complete? Is there a definite 
logical progression from the oldest doctrine to the newest? I am 
inclined to deny both assertions • The circumstances in which the 
various theologies of deification , sanctification and justification 
arose were very different and it would be very difficult to argue 
that there was , for instance , a direct logical link between the 
thought of the earlier Aquinas and the later Palamas • This is 
because the factors which shaped Catholic theology were different 
from those which influenced Orthodoxy • Furthermore , the factors 
which ga~e rise to the Reformation were not present in Orthodox 
areas, and this makes it difficult to argue that the theology of 
grace necessarily evolved from the Orthodox to the Protestant 
position • In any event , our study of Luther's work shows strong 
Augustinian influence which precedes both Palamas and Aquinas and 
suggests that the Protestant position was a return to older seminal 
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traditions rather than simply a development of Orthodox and Catholic 
ideas • Luther's theology of grace was a rebuttal of Aquinas' in many 
respects • 
The implication of all this is that it is not possible to interpret 
the historically consecutive ideas of Palamas , Aquinas and Luther as 
being a logical progression • 
THE DYNAMIC OF GRACE. 
If a complete theology of the relationship between nature and grace 
cannot be presented simply by stating the latest historical account 
of the doctrine , as would be the case if it could be shown that 
Aquinas' theology led directly to the theology of Palamas which in 
turn led directly to the theology of Luther , then a comprehensive 
theology of grace needs to incorporate the aspirations and strengths 
of each of the three traditions • These traditions provide the 
resources for a complete theology of grace , and to ignore any one of 
them or to give undue emphasis to any one of them would diminish the 
comprehensiveness of the end result • Due account must be taken of 
the fundamental concerns held in focus by each of the theologians as 
they developed their theologies of grace • 
It has been argued that the Orthodox Palamas was primarily a mystical 
theologian concerned with deification his theology steered a middle 
course between naturalism and dualism. The Catholic Aquinas was 
concerned with sanctification as a solution to an ontological 
problem; his theology steered a middle course between secularism and 
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supernatura l ism. The Protestant Luther saw justification as the 
solution to the moral predicament of sin , and his theology marks a 
reaction against what he felt were undue emphases on both metaphysics 
and natural theology • 
The crux of my position is that a complete theology of grace needs to 
be constructed by recognising the equal importance of the 
ontological, moral and mystical problems with which these theologians 
were concerned • In other words due account must be taken of the 
structure of human nature , the moral dispositions of people and the 
understanding of how union with God ultimately occurs • It is surely 
possible to show that the influence of grace on nature is a dynamic 
process that begins with sanctification , moves through justification 
and culminates in deification • The reason for placing them in this 
order lies in the views of the human predicament adopted by the 
theologians • Aquinas viewed human nature as open to God but unable 
to reach God of itself • Thus the first movement of grace would need 
to remove this ontological problem, enabling human nature in 
principle to realise its capacity _ for God • This first movement would 
be what is known as sanctification • Luther viewed human nature as 
curved in upon itself , morally rather than ontologically , in fact 
rather than in principle • The second movement of grace would need to 
restore the integrity of human nature in the eyes of God and to begin 
actualising the now real possibility of union with God • Such a 
second movement would be what is called justification • The third 
movement of grace would bring about that unity with God by means of a 
gradual transformation of the sanctified and justified human being • 
This transformation would begin during human life but would culminate 
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only beyond death • This third movement of grace would be 
deification. 
Such a doctrine of grace would emphasise the dynamic process that 
grace initiates , moving from sanctification through justification to 
deification • This would not be to say that any one of the three 
phases is more important than the others ; they would all be 
necessary moments in the salvation of the person .rt is worthwhile at 
this stage to speculate further on some of the elements of such a 
dynamic theology of grace • 
The first movement of grace is sanctification : that which makes 
possible the bridging of the gap between humanity and God • At this 
stage a clear understanding of the structure and limitations of human 
nature would be necessary , as it is these which prevent the ordinary 
union of humanity and divinity • In this regard it should be noted 
that today , in addition to the resources provided by Palamas , 
Aquinas and Luther , the disciplines of sociology and psychology have 
a great deal to offer in the attempt to understand human nature more 
clearly • 
Another interesting implication of seeing sanctification as a 
distinct moment in the process of grace's activity is the way in 
which some of the traditional sacraments could be regarded as having 
an essentially sanctifying effect • I am thinking particularly of 
baptism, which is of course accepted as a sacrament in all three 
traditions • Catholic confirmation and Orthodox chrismation could 
also be considered in this context , because these are the sacraments 
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of initiation into Christian life • As such , they mark the beginning 
of the process of salvation for Christians and the granting of grace · 
to the Christian by God • Hence these sacraments are particularly 
significant as sanctifying moments of grace • 
The second movement of grace is that of justification : the moral 
purification of humanity • In this context grace could be seen to be 
at work in anything which contributes to the moral purification of 
humanity • This moral purification should not be confused with 
moralism it is not morality simply for morality's sake but morality 
for the sake of union with God • To this end various Protestant 
emphases could profitably be used at this point , particularly the 
stress laid on scripture as normative for Christian ethics and on 
preaching as a way of inspiring people to better lives • 
It would be important not to understand morality and hence 
justification in purely individualistic terms • It would be seen as 
both a social and individual issue , or in other words as both 
structural and personal • In this context social justice would have 
to receive as much emphasis as individual repentance • The traditions 
of theological reflection on questions of social justice would play 
an important role here • 
In this context a sacramental aspect could also be brought in • The 
sacrament of penance , while not recognised as a sacrament by Luther, 
could be regarded as a sign of personal dedication on the part of 
Christians to live out their justification • In this way the 
essential experience of justification , namely the forgiveness of 
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sin, would be emphasised • 
The third movement of grace is deification : the transformation of 
humanity so that union with God takes place • At this point it can be 
said that all those things which point to or bring about such 
transformation of humanity would be regarded as part of deifying 
grace • 
At the sacramental level , then , those sacraments that are concerned 
with various moments of change could fit in here • The eucharist is 
the prime example of such a sacrament , and it is the only one which 
Luther would have accepted • Whatever the technicalities of the 
theology of eucharistic transformation , it can safely be said that 
all three traditions regard the eucharist as symbolic of the 
transformation of nature by grace • With regard to the eucharist , 
then , liturgy should be not merely a reflection of the actual 
conditions of life but a celebration of the transformation of life by 
grace • 
Apart from the eucharist , other sacraments accepted among Catholics 
and Orthodox that could be considered here would be marriage , 
ordination to particular ministries within the church and the 
anointing of the sick • All these sacraments have to do with changing 
states of life and as such could be appropriately considered as part 
of the movement of deifying grace • 
A further aspect that should be considered here is that of 
spirituality • There are vast resources in all three traditions that 
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show how to develop a spirituality that best expresses the movement 
towards eventual union with God , ranging from the iconic 
spirituality of Orthodoxy through the sacramental spirituality of 
Catholicism to the biblical spirituality of Protestantism. All three 
can offer elements for a rich spirituality of deification • 
THE ROLE OF JESUS IN A DYNAMIC THEOLOGY OF GRACE • 
The implications of such a doctrine of grace for the role of Jesus in 
salvation would also need to be spelled out • The Catholic notion of 
Jesus' death doing satisfaction for sin and causing an overflow of 
grace would be presented as the event which secured the availability 
of sanctifying grace for humanity and thus as the event which made it 
possible to bridge the gap between divinity and humanity .The death 
of Jesus would also need to be shown as the event which secured the 
forgiveness of the sins of humanity , thus showing how the death of 
Jesus should be seen as a moment of justifying grace • Finally , 
Jesus contributes to the deification of humanity by voluntarily 
submitting to the power of death and thus overcoming that power and 
its chain-reaction of sin and self-preservation • 
The example of Jesus as the model of nature transformed and 
transfigured by grace should be presented in scriptural exposition in 
the form of study and preaching • The transformation represented by 
the Christ-figure should be clearly shown in the use of the 
sacraments • 
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THE CHURCH AND A DYNAMIC THEOLOGY OF GRACE. 
The church would be seen as the social situation in which the dynamic 
of grace was most clearly operative • The pastoral life of the church 
should be shaped by a concern to show that the transformation of 
human life by grace is possible , that the forgiveness of sin and the 
establishment of righteousness and justice before God is a reality 
and that deification is actually the end of Christian life • 
In this perspective the notion of the church as the "body of Christ" 
could integrate these various emphases • Participation in the body of 
Christ could link people with the sanctifying power of grace , 
particularly with regard to the initial reception of grace in 
sacraments like baptism • A real participation and openness to others 
in the body of Christ ( or the "communion of saints") would be the 
substance of the forgiveness of sin and promotion of justice 
experienced in justifying grace • Finally the traditions of 
spirituality within the church could constantly sustain the vision of 
the deifying end of Christian life • 
SUMMARY. 
The project of developing a dynamic theology of grace is not simply a 
matter of synthesising disitinctive vocabularies • It can only be 
achieved coherently if due account is taken of the differences of 
emphasis discernible in the three traditions , and in this connection 
it is vital to bear in mind that while 
Eastern theology is chiefly preoccupied with 
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finding out what , in God , makes him able to 
give Himself , that of the West is concerned 
particularly with what it is , in man , which 
allows him to receive God • (4) 
In spite of these differences of emphasis it seems that these three 
traditions are not incompatible and that , if viewed as a dynamic 
process , it is quite possible to develop a doctrine of grace's 
effect on human nature which equally stresses sanctification , 
justification and deification by presenting them as successive stages 
in the dynamic of grace • 
This dissertation has attempted to examine representative resources 
for the theology of grace in the Orthodox , Catholic and Protestant 
Christian traditions ; it has also presented an outline of a dynamic 
theology of grace that would draw on those resources in an inclusive, 
responsible and coherent manner • 
1. -Ware , K. 
2. Aquinas , T. 
3. Luther , M. 
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